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I. INTRODUCTION
In domestic disputes, family members, persons in courtship, and
sexual partners may be motivated to record telephone conversations
or access e-mail or voicemail communications to protect their per-
ceived self-interest or out of spite and anger.2 The unauthorized ac-
cess of the content of conversations or communications in domestic
disputes is an invasion of any non-consenting person's privacy. This
Article examines whether such invasions of privacy are legally
justified.
The full extent of intra-family eavesdropping is not determinable
for obvious reasons. Persons generally have no way of knowing
whether their conversations are surreptitiously listened to. A success-
ful eavesdropper does so in secret. Even if the invasion of privacy is
discovered the victim may be reluctant to come forward because of the
potentially embarrassing content of the conversation. Currently,
there is no national commitment to study the extent of illegal eaves-
dropping in the United States. In 1976, however, an important study
that reviewed laws relating to electronic surveillance was published.3
It suggested that illegal surveillance in marital and domestic disputes
was a significant problem. The study indicated that 79% of the illegal
wiretapping reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for
which a motive could be identified involved surveillance by spouses,
2. The term "domestic disputes" is used in this Article to include disputes between
those who are married or have a family relationship. The Article does not ad-
dress the interesting question of whether homosexual or bisexual relationships
(where there are no children involved) that have been granted some form of part-
nership status under law would get the benefit of the exceptions to eavesdropping
laws that have been granted to those in a marriage or family relationship.
3. NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE REVIEW OF FED. & STATE LAWS RELATING TO WIRETAPPING
AND ELEC. SURVEILLANCE [hereinafter National Commission], ELEC. SURVEIL-
LANCE 160 (1976) [hereinafter the NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT of 1970]. The
Commission was created pursuant to a mandate in Section 804 of the Omnibus
Crime Control Act of 1968. Unfortunately there has been no subsequent commis-
sions or other governmental bodies that have updated the data in the national
Commission Report of 1976.
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parents, or those in courtship.4 Many of these illegal surveillances
were instituted with the advice of an attorney and the assistance of a
private detective.5 Clearly electronic surveillance of conversations in
marital and custody disputes is not uncommon. The increase in court
adjudications of electronic eavesdropping arising from domestic dis-
putes suggests that these activities may be on the rise. It is also clear
that spouses are accessing e-mail and tracking computer use in con-
nection with domestic disputes.
The legality of electronic surveillance of conversations and acces-
sing of e-mail is complicated. Several legal institutions are implicated
by these activities. Section I of this Article identifies the values that
are at stake when electronic surveillance is employed in marriage and
custodial disputes. Section II examines the legality of electronic sur-
veillance in domestic disputes under state and federal wiretap and
stored communications acts and the common law privacy intrusion
tort. Section III examines the extent to which the fruits of violations
of wiretap and stored communications acts or the privacy intrusion
tort are excluded from divorce and custody proceedings. Section IV
examines the availability of protective orders and other legal tools
which minimize the scope of legal electronic surveillance and provide
some protection against invasions of privacy to innocent participants
of conversations or communications that are acquired in legal intra-
family surveillance.
II. VALUES AT STAKE IN MARITAL AND
CUSTODIAL SURVEILLANCE
Important values are implicated when conversations, communica-
tions, and images are surreptitiously tape recorded or videotaped.
Conversational privacy is an important form of informational and
physical privacy. "Informational privacy" refers to a condition, value,
interest, or right that embodies a concern about limiting access to
one's personal affairs. Physical privacy is the right to decide who shall
have access to a physical space or physical access to one's body. Infor-
mational privacy and physical privacy sometimes collapse into each
other. Hiding a tape recorder in someone's bedroom invades both in-
formational and physical privacy. 6
4. Id.
5. See id. at 161.
6. See Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239 (1964). For a more general account of
the author's views on informational privacy, see RICHARD C. TURKINGTON & ANITA
L. ALLEN, PRIVACY LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 77 (2d ed. 2002).
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Conversational privacy is valued on both intrinsic and instrumen-
talist grounds.7 Some commentators and jurists view privacy as a
value that is essential to our status as persons with dignity rights.
Limiting who has acquaintance with the content of one's conversation
is a feature of the dignity that is essential to personhood. An influen-
tial voice in explicitly connecting privacy and respect for persons was
the philosopher Stanley Benn.8 Benn contends that the essence of the
wrong that occurs through invasions of privacy from unlicensed obser-
vations of someone is lack of respect for the subject as a person.
Under this view, surreptitious acquisition of the contents of a conver-
sation is a "blow to human dignity."9
In addition to being intrinsically valuable, conversational privacy
is also important because it is an instrument for furthering other im-
portant values. Expecting that what one says to others is private is
essential for entering into and altering personal, intimate, and politi-
cal associations.10 As some jurists have observed, "[n]o one talks to a
recorder as he talks to a person."1 1 Moreover, privacy in conversa-
tions promotes spontaneous expressions of thoughts and emotions
that make it possible for others to know an individual and for that
individual to know others. Conversational privacy is also viewed as
essential to the formation of self identity and personality. The same
arguments and values apply to the importance of privacy in communi-
cations like e-mail, which do not involve the human voice.12
7. For a general account of the various views of privacy as a value that is an intrin-
sic good and as a value that is instrumentally good because of what privacy does
for other important values, see TURKINGTON & ALLEN, supra note 6, at 27-29.
8. See Stanley I. Benn, Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons, in PRIVAcY: NO-
MOS XIII 1-26 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1971).
9. See Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to
Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 974 (1964) (characterizing eavesdropping,
wiretapping, and the unwanted entry into one's house as a "blow to human dig-
nity"); see also TURKINGTON & ALLEN, supra note 6, at 50-51 (providing a general
account of the dignity and respect for person foundations of privacy law).
10. See United States v. United States Dist. Court for E.D. Mich., 407 U.S. 297 (1972)
(holding that the President did not have the inherent power to wiretap phones of
United States citizens); Commonwealth v. Blood, 507 N.E.2d 1029 (Mass. 1987)
(noting Massachusetts law prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures violated
by electronic surveillance of conversations in the home unless all of the parties
have consented); see also Bartnicki v. Vopper. 532 U.S. 514, 532 (2001) (recogniz-
ing the role of privacy in communications in "uninhibited exchange of ideas"
amongst citizens).
11. See Blood, 507 N.E. 2d at 1036 (quoting Holmes v. Burr, 486 F.2d 55, 72 (9th Cir.
1973) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting)).
12. See generally A. Michael Froomkin, Flood Control on the Information Ocean: Liv-
ing with Anonymity, Digital Cash, and Distribted Databases, 15 J.L. & COM. 395
(1996); Donald J. Karl, State Regulation of Anonymous Internet Use After ACLU
of Georgia v. Miller, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 513 (1998); TURKINGTON & ALLEN, supra
note 6, at 450.
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A. Countervailing Values
The countervailing values that are asserted to justify encroach-
ments on conversational and communication privacy in marital and
custodial electronic surveillance cases are parental autonomy in child
rearing, the best interests of the child, and the integrity of the fact
finding process in divorce and custody proceedings.
Parental autonomy in decisions involving the rearing and upbring-
ing of their children is a longstanding value in the United States.13
Until the age of majority, parents have the authority to decide most
decisions for their children. This parental autonomy may include a
decision to invade the informational and physical privacy of their chil-
dren. With minor children legally incapable of consent, parents have
autonomy to access their children's health records and consent to
physical invasions of privacy through beneficial medical procedures.
Parental autonomy in child rearing, however, is not absolute. In some
cases parental decisions are overridden where the decision is not in
the physical or emotional best interests of the child.14 The best inter-
ests of the child may also override the informational and physical pri-
vacy values of the parents. Where a question of physical or sexual
abuse has been raised in psychiatric examination of a parent, the pri-
vacy and confidentiality of health information gives way to the inter-
est in the physical and psychological well being of the child.15
B. Some of the Complexities in Accommodating Values in
Spousal or Parental Electronic Surveillance Cases
There are several features of parental or spousal electronic surveil-
lance that make the accommodation of values complicated in some
cases.
13. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding parents have right to control
the content of their children's education); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)
(holding Wisconsin compulsory public school attendance law interfered with par-
ent's rights to religious expression protected by First Amendment).
14. One example, which is not the focus of this Article, would be where the child's life
could be saved with a blood transfusion, but the parents' religious beliefs forbid
the procedure. See, e.g., State v. Rogers, 20 P.3d 166, 169 (Okla. Civ. App. 2001)
(discussing a compelling interest of a state in preserving the lives of children).
15. Originally states adopted laws requiring physicians to report suspected physical
and sexual abuse to authorities. Today, most states have greatly extended the
scope of this duty to mental health professionals. The duty of both physicians
and mental health professionals is triggered where there is a reasonable basis for
suspicion of abuse. Moreover, some jurisdictions impose criminal liability for a
failure to disclose such information to the proper authorities. For a more in depth
analysis of the issues surrounding disclosure of confidential communications in
psychotherapy, see RICHARD C. TURKINGTON & ROBERT M. WETTSTEIN, CONFIDEN-
TIALITY LAw AND THE TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE IN PSYCHIATRY, reprinted from PsY-
CHIATRY (Robert Michaels et al. eds., rev. ed 1996/97).
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1. The Inherent Pervasiveness of Electronic Surveillance
Electronic surveillance through a wiretap or bug16 is inherently
pervasive. A wiretap, bug, or the downloading of a person's e-mail or
voicemail breaches the conversational and communication privacy of
all non-consenting persons that are talking on the telephone or are a
part of the conversation or e-mail communication. Even if there are
justifications for invading the privacy of a targeted person the privacy
of non-targeted persons is invaded. Persons whose privacy is invaded
without justification are innocent victims of the inherent pervasive-
ness of electronic surveillance technology. Electronic surveillance
may provide access to, and extra-judicial disclosure of, highly personal
and intimate information of innocent persons. In the sections that fol-
low, this Article will show that the pervasive nature of electronic sur-
veillance is not adequately accounted for in much of the law on
electronic surveillance. When adequately taken into account the per-
vasive nature of electronic surveillance may push the accommodation
of values in favor of conversational and communication privacy.
2. Parental Autonomy, The Best Interests of the Child, and
Minor Autonomy
Parental autonomy to electronically eavesdrop on the conversa-
tions or communications of a minor child is limited when the surveil-
lance is not in the best interest of the child or where the surveillance
violates the minor's autonomy to communicate. As observed above,
the best interests of the child may override parental choices on chil-
drearing and parental informational privacy values. Beyond this
there is an emerging tradition in our legal system to grant minors self
determination in respect to decisions that have traditionally been left
exclusively to parents. 17 Much of the discussion in commentary and
law focuses on empirical studies that suggest that minors are compe-
tent to make important decisions at ages much earlier than tradi-
tional legal ages of majority.18 Statutes have been enacted in several
states providing for "mature minors" to have the right to informed
16. A "wiretap" involves acquisition of the contents of a conversation that is trans-
mitted from one point to another in some part by a system involving wires. Inter-
cepting telephone conversations is a classic wiretap. A "bug" involves the use of a
transmitter or tape recorder to acquire the contents of face to face conversations.
17. See Kellie Smidt, "Who Are You To Say What My Best Interest Is?" Minors' Due
Process Rights When Admitted by Parents for Inpatient Mental Health Treatment,
71 WASH. L. REV. 1187 (1996), for a background on the changing landscape of
minors' right to consent for treatment.
18. See RICHARD E. REDDING, DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS FOR JUVENILES IN CIVIL
COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS 24 (Elissa C. Lichtenstein et al. eds., 1991). For a
source of state law that demonstrates the variable ages adopted by legislation for
minors' consent, see NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE LAws 443-56 (Richard A. Leiter
ed., 3d ed. 1999).
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consent for medical treatment and psychotherapy.19 In psychother-
apy, the right of a minor's informed consent for treatment is thought
by psychotherapists to facility mental health treatment. 20 The impor-
tance of this recent development is that the rigid historic view that
parents have autonomy over dependent children until they reach the
age of eighteen or twenty-one is being replaced in some states by a
flexible view that minors reaching a level of competency have the right
to decide certain matters for themselves. This changing landscape of
minor autonomy and the limitations on parental autonomy where the
best interests of the child are at stake, need to be taken into account in
parental electronic eavesdropping cases.
III. FEDERAL AND STATE WIRETAP AND STORED
COMMUNICATIONS ACTS AND THE COMMON LAW
PRIVACY INTRUSION TORT
The importance of conversational and communication privacy val-
ues are reflected in several legal institutions that are brought to bear
in parental and spousal electronic surveillances cases. Three of these
legal institutions are federal wiretap and stored communications acts,
state wiretap and stored communications acts, and the common law
privacy intrusion tort.
A. Background on Federal Wiretap Law
The recording of telephone and face-to-face conversations and the
accessing of e-mail and voicemail are primarily regulated by federal
and state wiretap and stored communications statutes. The federal
wiretap statute is notorious for its lack of clarity. 2 1 It will be helpful
to begin by laying a foundation of the basic concepts and structure of
federal law and identifying areas where there is some clarity.
In 1928, the Supreme Court, in Olmstead v. United States, held
that a government wiretap was not a search under the Fourth Amend-
ment. 22 Chief Justice Taft, writing for the majority, concluded there
was no search because the electronic device attached to the wire
outside of Olmstead's home did not amount to a physical trespass.2 3
19. See Tania E. Wright, A Minor's Right to Consent to Medical Care, 25 HOWARD L.
J. 525, 528-38 (1982) (arguing for drastic legislative reform of minor consent law
in view of inconsistent and inadequate common law and legislative rules).
20. See Redding, supra note 18, at 18.
21. See United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that this
characterization by the Fifth Circuit of the federal wiretap statute may have been
too generous).
22. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
23. Id. at 464-65. The physical trespass notion of a Fourth Amendment search was
junked by the Supreme Court almost forty years later in Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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The Court did note, however, that the privacy of telephone conversa-
tions could be protected by direct legislation.24 Congress responded in
1934 by enacting the Federal Communications Act (FCA).25 Section
604 of the FCA prohibited interception of conversations, but was lim-
ited in several ways. Evidence obtained in violation of the FCA could
be admitted in state court. In addition, the Justice Department and
FBI interpreted § 605 to only prohibit wiretaps that were "di-
vulged."26 Finally, the Supreme Court severely limited application of
§ 605 in transmission monitoring or "bugging" cases that did not in-
volve wiretapping by imposing a trespass requirement on these forms
of electronic eavesdropping. 27
In 1967, the Supreme Court junked the trespass concept of a
Fourth Amendment search and reversed Olmstead.2s In Katz v.
United States,29 the Court held that electronic surveillance of a con-
versation by the government constituted a search if the person had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the conversation. This shift from
a trespass based notion of a Fourth Amendment search to one based
on an individual's expectation of privacy was paradigmatic. Katz
ushered in the modern era of informational privacy law. As discussed
later in this Article, the expectation of privacy principle, as employed
by courts since Katz, is fraught with problems. Nevertheless, the idea
that a legally recognized expectation of privacy is the sina qua non for
prima facie privacy protection permeates informational privacy law in
the private and public sector.30
Partially in response to the limited protection provided within
§ 605 and the emergence of constitutional protection for conversa-
tional privacy after Katz, Congress enacted the first comprehensive
federal statute regulating virtually all forms of electronic surveillance
24. Id. at 465-66 (noting that Congress could protect wire communications by making
them inadmissible in judicial proceedings).
25. Federal Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 605, 48 Stat. 1103 (1934)
(amended by 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1968)).
26. See, e.g., Herbert Brownell, Jr., The Public Security and Wiretapping, 39 COR-
NELL. L. REV. 195, 197-99 (1954); John Decker & Joel Handler, Electronic Surveil-
lance: Standards, Restrictions, and Remedies, 12 CAL. W. L. REV. 60, 163 (1975).
27. Compare On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 749-51 (1952) (holding that there
was no violation of § 605 where a conversation is recorded by someone who is
"wired for sound"), with Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (holding
that § 605 was not applicable where the government used a foot-long spike
microphone to record a conversation).
28. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
29. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Katz involved the attachment of an electronic transmitter to
a telephone booth that Katz was conversing from and is a transmission monitor-
ing case. Earlier during the same term, the Court had assumed that a govern-
ment wiretap was a Fourth Amendment search in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S.
41 (1967) (construing portions of the New York wiretap statute as unconstitu-
tional under the Fourth Amendment).
30. See Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 479 (Cal. 1998).
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of conversations. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Street Acts of 1968 nationalized the law of federal, state, and private
electronic surveillance of conversations. 3 l This statute was commonly
referred to as the "Wiretap Act" or "Title III."
Congress enacted The Wiretap Act with several objectives in mind.
The Wiretap Act was designed to establish the authority and stan-
dards for government wiretaps for criminal investigations. Concern is
expressed in the legislative history that the government's electronic
eavesdropping authority should be clarified to respond to the per-
ceived growing threat of organized crime. In addition, The Wiretap
Act was enacted for the purpose of protecting private individuals
against wiretapping in domestic disputes and to protect against vari-
ous forms of wiretapping in the business sector. The extension of The
Wiretap Act's prohibition against intercepting conversations to "any
person,"32 by providing for minimal liquidated damages, 33 a strong ex-
clusionary rule, 34 and the right to recover attorneys' fees and court
costs for all violations, reflected concern for protecting conversational
privacy in the private sphere.35
The Wiretap Act only protected conversational privacy. This limi-
tation was contained in the prohibition against interception of "wire or
oral" communications. Wire communications were those communica-
tions involving the human voice that were transmitted from the point
of origin to the point of reception through the use of wire.3 6 Convers-
ing on the telephone is the paradigm of a "wire communication." Face-
to-face conversations are the paradigm of an "oral communication." A
wiretap is the paradigm of an interception of a wire communication;
bugging a conversation through a tape recorder or transmitter is the
paradigm of interception of an oral communication. The Wiretap Act
generally prohibited the interception of a wire or oral communication
without a court order 37 unless one of the parties has consented. 38
31. See generally Jeremiah Courtney, Electronic Eavesdropping, Wiretapping and
Your Right to Privacy, 26 FED. Comm. B.J. 1 (1973); JAMES G. CARR & PATRICIA L.
BELLIA, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE (West 2001).
32. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (2000).
33. 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (2000).
34. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (2000).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (2000).
36. The 1968 version of the Wiretap Act restricted wire communications to those
transmitted by telephone companies licensed by the FCC. Wiretap Act, tit. III,
§ 2510, 82 Stat. 197 (1968).
37. Court ordered surveillance is limited to law enforcement bugs or wiretaps. Sec-
tion 2518 establishes strict requirements for court authorized interceptions of
wire communications. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2000).
38. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(2)(c)-(d) (2000) (containing consent defenses).
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B. Enter the 1986 Electronic Communications Act: The
ECPA
In 1986, the federal statute was amended by The Electronics Com-
munications Privacy Act (ECPA).39 Congress enacted The Wiretap
Act in 1968 to deal with the then current issues facing privacy law.
Title III was directed at the existing technology for electronic surveil-
lance of communications. This consisted primarily of wiretaps and
small recorders or transmitters placed upon a person in the place
where the communication occurred. During the decades following the
passage of The Wiretap Act, however, communication technology
changed dramatically. By 1986, many communications were trans-
mitted by means other than the telephone or face-to-face conversa-
tions and by systems owned and managed by entities that were not
licensed common carriers. Today, many conversations are transmit-
ted by radio signals through cellular systems or cordless phones. In
addition, many companies have private phone systems that they tie
into the systems of common carriers. There is increasing use of digital
technology to electronically communicate through electronic mail and
facsimile machines.
The amendments to the Wiretap Act, which resulted from the 1986
passage of the ECPA, responded to the technological advances that
had developed since 1968. The response to the new technology is em-
bodied in the addition of the concept of "electronic communication" to
the statute.40 The ECPA generally prohibits the interception of, and
unauthorized access to, stored electronic communications. This addi-
tion brings the surveillance of digitally transmitted conversations,
electronic mail, cellular phones, and pen registers within the regula-
tory reach of the statute. While the ECPA restructured and extended
federal law in important ways, 4 1 the 1986 amendments also added to
the confusion surrounding the Wiretap Act. The ECPA Amendments
now divide the Wiretap Act into Title I, II, and III. The former Title
III is now Title I of the ECPA.42 Title 143 of the ECPA now regulates
the interception of conversations. Title 1144 of the ECPA regulates ac-
cess to e-mail, fax communications, and voicemail. Title 11145 of the
ECPA regulates call-tracing devices such as caller ID. The two titles
most relevant to this discussion are Title I and Title II. This Article
39. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-3127 (1994).
40. See COMMITrEE ON THE JUDICIARY, THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY
ACT OF 1986, H.R. REP. No. 99-647, at 2 (1986).
41. For a general analysis of restructuring of the Wiretap Act by the ECPA, see
TURKINGTON & ALLEN, supra note 6, at 294.
42. Out of habit, some courts and commentators continue to speak of the federal stat-
ute as "Title III." This is not technically correct.
43. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000).
44. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (2000).
45. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (2000).
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will refer to Title I as the "Wiretap Act" and Title II as the "Stored
Communications Act".4 6
C. ECPA's Scope and Remedies
The Wiretap and Stored Communications Acts apply to both gov-
ernment and private action. The Wiretap Act imposes criminal and
civil liability for intentional interceptions of conversations in violation
of the statute.4 7 The Wiretap Act provides for recovery of both actual
and punitive damages. 48 In addition, minimal liquidated damages of
$10,000 may be imposed for violations of the Wiretap Act.49 Moreo-
ver, the Wiretap Act also contains a strong exclusionary rule prohibit-
ing courts and administrative agencies from admitting into evidence
the content of taped conversations that are acquired in violation of the
statute.5 0 Attorneys' fees and court costs are also available to the pre-
vailing party.
There are important differences in the scope of regulations and
remedies under the Wiretap Act and the Stored Communications Act.
Similar to the Wiretap Act, the Stored Communications Act applies to
both government and private action as well as providing actual and
punitive damages, but the liquidated damages are less; only $1,000,51
and most importantly, however, there is not an exclusionary rule for
violations of Stored Communications Act.52 The requirements for
court ordered surveillance under the Wiretap Act are stricter than
what is required for court ordered access to stored electronic commu-
nications under the Stored Communications Act. Both the Wiretap
Act and the Stored Communications Act of the ECPA preempt state
laws that provide less security for conversations and electronic com-
munications, but state laws can provide for greater security. For ex-
ample, if one party consents to the recording of a conversation there is
46. See generally TURKINGTON & ALLEN, supra note 6, at 294-397.
47. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2000).
48. State statutes have similar damage rules. See, e.g., M.G. v. J.C., 603 A.2d 990
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1992) (upholding $50,000 punitive damage award
against husband for violation of the New Jersey Wiretapping Act).
49. 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (2000). The minimum liquidated damage amount was changed
in 1986 (with the ECPA amendments) from $1,000 to $10,000. Language in
§ 2520 was changed from "shall be entitled to damages" to a court "may" assess
damages. Most courts have viewed the change to mean that awarding damages
is discretionary and that damages should not be awarded for de minimis viola-
tions of the Wiretap Act. See Goodspeed v. Harman, 39 F. Supp. 2d 787, 791
(N.D. Tex. 1999).
50. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (2000).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 2707(c) (2000).
52. No exclusionary rule is specifically found in Title II. Section 2708 states that
"remedies and sanctions described in this chapter are the only judicial remedies
and sanctions for nonconstitutional violations of this chapter." 18 U.S.C. § 2708
(2000).
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no violation of Title I of the ECPA. In states like Florida,53 Penn-
sylvania,5 4 Maryland, 55 and California,56 however, both parties must
consent for the recording of a conversation by private parties to be
legal under the applicable state wiretap law.
D. Recording of Conversations in the Marital Home
As noted above, telephone conversations, including those commu-
nicated over cell phones, are "wire communications" under the Wire-
tap Act. The Wiretap Act specifically prohibits "any person" from
intercepting a wire communication without a court order or the con-
sent of one of the parties to the conversation.5 7 Despite the absence of
any express exception in the Wiretap Act for the nonconsensual tape
recording by one spouse of another spouse's conversation, some courts
have carved out a limited exception for interspousal taping of tele-
phone conversations in the marital home. This exception is some-
times referred to by commentators as the "interspousal" or "marital/
domestic" conflict exception to the Wiretap Act.
In 1974, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals exempted some inter-
spousal electronic surveillance from the Federal Wiretap Act. In
Simpson v. Simpson5 8 , the court held that the recording of telephone
conversations in the marital home by a husband who suspected his
wife of infidelity did not violate the Wiretap Act. The plain language
of the Wiretap Act does not provide for an interspousal/marital con-
flict exception. Section 2511 imposes criminal or civil responsibility
on "any person" who willfully intercepts a telephone conversation.
The Simpson court, however, found an implied exception for inter-
spousal wiretapping on the basis that Congress did not intend for the
Wiretap Act to be thrust into marital controversies or to override state
interspousal tort immunity. The court also found that the exception
in the statute for ordinary use of an extension phone by the subscriber
supported excluding spousal eavesdropping from coverage of the Wire-
tap Act.59 Simpson has been followed in only one other federal cir-
cuit. 60 Most of the federal circuits follow the plain language of the
ECPA and have not recognized an interspousal exception for wiretap-
ping in the marital home.61 The majority of courts have also inter-
53. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.03(3)(d) (West 2000).
54. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5704(4) (West 1983 & Supp. 1998).
55. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-402(C)(3) (1998).
56. CAL. PENAL CODE § 631(a) (West 1998 & Supp. 1998).
57. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, 2511(2)(d) (2000).
58. 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1974).
59. The ordinary use of an extension phone exemption is examined more fully in the
section on parental eavesdropping that follows.
60. See Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1977).
61. See Heggy v. Heggy, 944 F.2d 1537 (10th Cir. 1991); Kempf v. Kempf, 868 F.2d
970 (8th Cir. 1989); Pritchard v. Pritchard, 732 F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 1984); United
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preted state wiretap acts to not include an interspousal exception for
wiretapping in the marital home.62
1. Limited to Spousal Eavesdropping in the Martial Home
In those jurisdictions where an interspousal exception has been
recognized the exception has been limited to eavesdropping by the
spouse in the marital home.6 3 Persons who assist the spouse in eaves-
dropping in the marital home, such as a private detective, are liable
under Title I even though the spouse is not.6 4
2. "Bugging Conversations" in the Marital Home
Face-to-face conversations are "oral communications" under the
Wiretap Act. Therefore, the placing of a recording device, commonly
referred to as a "bug", in a room or on a person for the purpose of
recording face-to-face conversations is subject to regulation under the
Wiretap Act as an interception of an oral communication. Where the
recording device is used to record the face-to-face conversations of a
spouse and another adult in the marital home the result would be
identical to the recording of a telephone conversation. If the jurisdic-
tion recognizes an interspousal exception, it would apply to the bug-
ging as well. If there was no recognized exception, the bugging would
be illegal. As explained in the section that follows, the wiretapping
and bugging of a conversation of a parent/child conversation is subject
to a somewhat different analysis.
E. Parental Tape Recording of Conversations of Children
The parental tape recording of conversations between a child and a
third party, generally the other parent, is not uncommon where there
States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976). The Eleventh Circuit is the latest
court to reject the exception for interspousal wiretapping within the marital
home. See Glazner v. Glazner, 347 F.3d 1212 (11th Cir. 2003). Sitting en banc all
of the members of the court rejected the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Simpson v.
Simpson. A majority of the court held that the decision should be applied retroac-
tively in civic cases. Judge Dubina dissented on the retroactive question.
62. See Carr, supra note 31, § 3.64, at 3-172 to 3-173 & n.25. One state wiretap act,
however, has been interpreted to contain an interspousal wiretap exception.
Wright v. Stanley, 700 So. 2d 274 (Miss. 1997).
63. See Anonymous, 558 F.2d at 679 (distinguishing Sixth Circuit case where spouse
no longer resided in marital home); Simpson, 490 F.2d at 809 (noting Title I re-
flects "Congress's intention to abjure from deciding a very intimate question of
familial relations, that of the extent of privacy family members may expect
within the home vis-a-vis each other").
64. See Simpson, 490 F.2d at 808-09 (noting others may still be liable even if spouse
is not).
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is a custody dispute.65 In such cases, the taping is regarded as more
permissible under federal and state wiretap laws. This is due to
courts' propensity to treat the recording as within the ordinary exten-
sion use exception to the wiretap statute or view the parent as having
authority to vicariously consent for the child.
1. The Extension Phone Exception
The Wiretap Act contains a narrow exception for electronic eaves-
dropping over an extension phone that is done for the ordinary use of
the subscriber. The ordinary use exception has arisen mostly in cases
where an employer records the conversations of employees on an ex-
tension phone. 66 Some courts, due to testimony in the legislative his-
tory of the Wiretap Act, have applied the doctrine in cases involving
custodial parents recording the conversations of their children. In
hearings before the House Judiciary Committee on the scope of the
ordinary use exception to the Wiretap Act, Professor Herman
Schwartz, speaking on behalf of the ACLU stated, "I take it nobody
wants to make it a crime for a father to listen in on his teenage daugh-
ter . . ."67 This language has been invoked by courts to support a
parental eavesdropping exception under federal and state statutes for
recording conversations on the extension phone of a child in the family
home.68
Recognition of a marital conflict and parental extension phone ex-
ception for electronic surveillance under the Wiretap Act has been lim-
ited and subject to considerable critical commentary. 6 9 The marital
conflict exception is distinctly a minority rule and has been roundly
criticized as unwarranted in view of the plain language and legislative
history of the Wiretap Act.70 Most state courts have not recognized a
65. See Jonathan E. Niemeyer, Note, All in the Family: Interspousal and Parental
Wiretapping Under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Act, 81 Ky. L.J. 237, 247
(1993).
66. See, e.g., Deal v. Spears, 980 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding employer liable
for recording employee's telephone conversations on an extension phone because
recording exceeded narrow scope of ordinary business use of extension phone ex-
ception). The ordinary course of business exception is found in § 2510(5)(a)(i)
which exempts electronic surveillance "by the subscriber or user in the ordinary
course of its business" from regulation under Title I of the ECPA. Id. at 1157
(noting the source of extension phone exception).
67. Hearings on the Anti-Crime Program Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm.
, on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 901 (1967).
68. See Scheib v. Grant, 22 F.3d 149, 154 (7th Cir. 1994); Newcomb v. Ingle, 944 F.2d
1534, 1536 n.5 (10th Cir. 1991); Anonymous, 558 F.2d at 679.
69. For a general criticism of the marital and parental exception, see Carr, supra
note 31, § 3.64, at 3-615.
70. Id. A thorough trashing of the arguments of the Simpson court is found in Judge
Celebrezze's opinion in United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976). See
discussion supra text accompanying notes 58-64. See also the arguments of the
court in Kratz v. Kratz. 477 F. Supp. 463 (E.D. Pa. 1979). Both decisions find the
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marital conflict exception.71 Many courts have also rejected the tele-
phone extension exception as applied to the tape recording of
conversations. 72
A potentially much broader exception, however, has recently been
recognized by courts that reject both the marital and telephone exten-
sion phone exceptions. 73 This new exception would authorize parental
electronic eavesdropping by granting a parent the authority to vicari-
ously consent for a minor child and thereby provide a defense to the
Federal Wiretap Act and those state wiretap acts that allow for elec-
tronic surveillance of conversations if one party has consented.
2. Vicarious Consent
The Wiretap Act is not violated if a party to the intercepted conver-
sation has consented. This one party consent rule is mirrored in most
state wiretap statutes. Parents and guardians of minors have the au-
thority to vicariously consent for the minor when it is perceived by the
parent to be in the best interests of the child. Does the parental au-
thority to consent for the child under state law include consenting to
the surreptitious recording of a conversation between the child and a
third person? If state law allows a parent to vicariously consent for
their child in respect to decisions such as whether to be subject to a
particular medical procedure, does that authority provide a consent
defense under The Wiretap Act? Does the authority for a parent to
consent for the child under state law include consenting to the surrep-
titious recording of a conversation between a child and the other par-
ent? Courts have generally answered both of these questions
affirmatively and have been increasingly willing to apply a vicarious
consent defense to parental eavesdropping.
The Tenth Circuit was the first federal court of appeals to suggest
vicarious consent was a defense under the Wiretap Act in Thompson v.
Dulaney.74 During the pendency of a divorce, Denise Dulaney taped
several conversations between the father and their minor children
while she and her children were living in her parents' home.75 Du-
laney had the tapes transcribed and distributed them to her family,
attorney, and expert witnesses. 76 Two of the transcripts were admit-
ted in the deposition of an expert witness during the custody litiga-
analysis of Judge Bell in Simpson v. Simpson to be without support in the lan-
guage, legislative history, or purposes of the Wiretap Act.
71. See infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., Thompson v. Dulaney, 970 F.2d 744 (10th Cir. 1992); Pollock v. Pollock,
154 F.3d 603 (6th Cir. 1998).
73. Pollock, 154 F.3d at 610.
74. 970 F.2d 744 (10th Cir. 1992).
75. Id. at 746.
76. Id.
[Vol. 82:693
2004] CONVERSATIONAL AND COMMUNICATION PRIVACY 709
tion.77 Thompson, the father, brought a damage action under the
Wiretap Act against his wife and his wife's parents, experts, and attor-
ney for taping and divulging the contents of recorded conversations
between himself and his children.78
The district court exempted the recordings under the interspousal
exception.7 9 The Tenth Circuit, in an earlier case, had rejected the
view that there was an interspousal exception to The Wiretap Act and
reversed the district court on this issue.8 0 The court remanded the
case to the district court, however, to determine whether consent was
a defense to the Wiretap Act action on the basis that the custodial
parent had the authority to vicariously consent for the child under
state law.8 1 On remand, the district court found that the mother, as
guardian of the child, had the right under state law to act on behalf of
the child, where to do so was in the child's best interest.8 2 Therefore,
in order to fulfill her responsibilities as guardian, the mother could
consent for the child under The Wiretap Act if she had "a good faith
basis that is objectively reasonable for believing that it is necessary to
consent on behalf of her minor children to the taping of the phone con-
versations ...."83
Most federal and state courts that have considered the issue have
applied a version of the vicarious consent doctrine in parental eaves-
dropping cases.8 4 The doctrine has been applied to parental eaves-
dropping on conversations between the other parent and their minor
children and third parties such as a babysitter.8 5
77. Id. at 746-47.
78. Id. at 746.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 747.
81. Id. at 749.
82. Thompson v. Dulaney, 838 F. Supp. 1535, 1544 (D. Utah 1993).
83. Id. at 1544.
84. See id.; Pollock v. Pollock, 154 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1998); Campbell v. Price, 2 F.
Supp. 2d 1186 (E.D. Ark. 1998); Silas v. Silas, 680 So. 2d 368 (Ala. Civ. App.
1996) (adopting the vicarious consent doctrine in interpreting state wiretap acts);
State v. Diaz, 706 A.2d 264 (N.J. Super. App. Ct. Div. 1998) (adopting the vicari-
ous consent doctrine in interpreting state wiretap acts); W. Va. Dep't of Health
and Human Res. ex rel Wright v. David L., 453 S.E.2d 646 (W. Va. 1994) (inter-
preting both the state and federal wiretap acts to include the vicarious consent
doctrine, while holding those provisions inapplicable in light of the specific facts
of the case). Currently, the only court to reject the vicarious consent doctrine has
been Williams v. Williams, 581 N.W.2d 1777 (Mich. 1998) (interpreting both the
Michigan and federal wiretap acts to not recognize vicarious consent in parental
eavesdropping cases).
85. See Diaz, 706 A.2d at 270 (upholding the admissibility of the audio portion of a
video tape in a criminal trial of babysitter for abuse of the child).
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a. Limitations on the Vicarious Consent Defense
The availability of the vicarious consent defense is fact specific.
The age of the minor and the purpose of the surveillance are factors
that are taken into account by courts. A leading case illustrating this
is Pollock v. Pollock.86 Samuel Pollock (Samuel) and his current wife
Laura Pollock (Laura) brought a damage action under the Wiretap Act
against Samuel's former wife, Sandra Pollock (Sandra), and her two
attorneys for tape recording and disclosing the contents of conversa-
tions between fourteen year old Courtney Pollock (Courtney) and Sa-
muel and Laura.8 7 The recordings occurred on an extension phone in
Sandra's home while Courtney was residing with her.8 8 The district
court entered summary judgment for the defendants.8 9 On appeal,
the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's adoption of the vicarious
consent defense under the Wiretap Act, but remanded the case to de-
termine whether Sandra's purpose in taping the conversations was
sufficient to preserve the consent defense.9 0 The record contained
conflicting evidence as to whether her motive in taping was out of gen-
uine concern for the best interest of the child.91 If Laura's motivation
in taping was to "gain access to Courtney's attorney-client communi-
cations" or if in some other sense was not motivated by the best inter-
est of the child, the defense of vicarious consent would not be
available. 9 2 Where evidence is disputed, motive presents a question of
fact that is sufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment.93
b. The Test for Parental Motive
As suggested by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Pollock, the
parent's motive in wiretapping or bugging a child's conversation is
crucial to the vicarious consent defense. The test adopted by Pollock
and other courts 94 is whether the parent had a "good faith, objectively
reasonable basis for believing such consent was necessary for the wel-
86. 154 F.3d 601(6th Cir. 1998).
87. Id. at 603 (noting facts surrounding the appeal). Sandra's attorneys, who were
named as defendants, were Oliver Barber and Luann Glidewell. Id.
88. Id. at 604 (noting Sandra's admission to recording phone calls on an extension
phone in her home).
89. Id. at 605.
90. Id. at 610-13.
91. Id. at 612-13 (noting "the question of material fact as to Sandra's motives").
92. Id. at 611.
93. See Kroh v. Kroh, 567 S.E.2d 760, 764 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (stating that an issue
of fact concerning a defendant parent's motivations for recording was sufficient to
preclude summary judgment).
94. Pollock adopts the test first articulated in Thompson v. Dulaney, 838 F. Supp.
1535 (D. Utah 1993).
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fare of the child."95 At least one other state, Alabama, has adopted a
stricter version of the parental motive test. Under this standard, the
parent must demonstrate a good faith, objectively reasonable belief
"that the minor child is being abused, threatened, or intimidated by
the other parent."96
c. Critique of the Vicarious Consent Rule
Given the reluctance of courts to sanction spousal eavesdropping
under the Wiretap Act for the reasons stated above, it is surprising
that the vicarious consent notion has been received favorably by
courts without critical examination. This section of the Article will
demonstrate that the vicarious consent doctrine should not be recog-
nized under the Wiretap Act. Some of the problems created by recog-
nition of a parent's right to consent to eavesdropping on a child's
conversations with the other parent and third parties are: (1) the joint
custody problem; (2) the non-identity of interests problem; and (3) the
minimization problem.
i. The Joint Custody Problem
One of the assumptions of the vicarious consent principle is that
authority to consent for the minor child under state law is incorpo-
rated into the one party consent defense under state and federal wire-
tap acts. This assumption ignores the rudimentary features of the
important development of joint custody that is recognized in most
states.9 7
The traditional model of custody was to grant one parent, usually
the mother, both legal custody and physical custody. Legal custody
entails the authority to make important decisions involving the up-
bringing of the child such as where to go to school and whether to be
treated medically. Physical custody entails decisions about where the
child shall reside and physical care. The traditional model of sole cus-
tody grants the custodial parent both legal and physical custody. Non-
custodial parents were given visitation rights.
Joint custody was recognized initially by California in 1980.98
Joint custody changes the division of responsibility that attached
under the traditional sole custody rule. With joint custody, one parent
generally has physical custody but both parents share the responsibil-
ity for legal custody. A leading commentator indicates that most often
95. Pollock, 154 F.3d at 610 (noting adoption of Thompson standard of vicarious
consent).
96. Silas v. Silas, 680 So. 2d 368, 371 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996).
97. See D. KELLY WEISBERG & SusAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW:
CASES & MATERIALS 844 (2d ed. 2002).
98. Some commentators suggest that the father's rights movement was an important
influence in the development of joint custody. Id. at 844-45.
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in joint custody arrangements, the child's care, education, religion,
medical treatment, and general welfare99 are shared by both parents.
If this form of joint custody under state law applies to the parents in a
vicarious consent eavesdropping case, the notion that the state law
gives one parent the sole authority to consent to the invasion of pri-
vacy of the minor child and the other parent makes no sense. If the
authority to vicarious consent is shared by both parents under state
law, then that state law is no warrant for the authority of one party to
consent for the child under state or federal wiretap acts. If the author-
ity to wiretap is shared, then vicarious consent to wiretap the conver-
sation of a non-physical custodial parent would only be warranted in
the unlikely case where that parent agrees to it.
There is virtually no discussion of the impact of the multiple kinds
of joint custody arrangements under state law on vicarious consent to
wiretapping under wiretap acts. In West Virginia ex rel. Wright v.
David L.,1oo the court of appeals in West Virginia suggested that the
vicarious consent doctrine is limited to the physical custodial parent.
David was separated from his wife, Lisa, who was given temporary
custody of their twin daughters, Chelsea and Ashley, ages 6, and their
son, Joshua, age 5.101 Lisa lived with the children in the marital
home. Prior to their divorce David asked his mother to place a voice
activated tape recorder in the children's bedroom while she babysat
for them.1O2
After listening to these taped conversations, David gave the tapes
to his lawyer. The tapes were played to a therapist for Family Ser-
vices, Inc. and a child protective service worker for the West Virginia
Department of Health and Human Resources, and thereafter, David
was given physical custody of the children.10 3 In reviewing whether
the tape recordings were legal under West Virginia law, the court as-
sumed that the vicarious consent principle applied to the state eaves-
dropping statute, but held that vicarious consent could not be
exercised by a parent with respect to conversations taking place in the
home of the parent with physical custody over the child.104 Therefore,
the recording violated the Wiretap Act and was not admissible in the
custody proceedings.
It seems odd to vest exclusive authority to the physical custodial
parent to decide whether to invade the privacy of the minor child and
the non-physical custodial parent when the non-physical parent has
99. See Harold Homer Clark, Jr., The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States,
§ 20.2, 482 (2d ed. 1988).
100. 453 S.E.2d 646 (W. Va. 1994).
101. Id. at 648.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 654.
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joint decisional authority to consent for the minor. In Wright, the
physical custodial parent had consented to physical access to the chil-
dren by the paternal grandparent and her exclusive authority to de-
cide physical access is preserved. Perhaps, the Wright decision is
palatable if the conversation with the child is viewed as a form of
physical custody. That is not a sensible interpretation of physical cus-
tody in a case like Wright. The non-physical custodial parent had the
right to converse over the telephone in Wright, and therefore, Lisa
Wright's physical custodial authority did not extend to physical access
to the children through conversing over the telephone with the other
parent. There might be a good argument for viewing taping of a
child's conversation with a parent as part of the authority of a physical
custodial parent in the rare and exceptional cases where the non-
physical custodial parent has been restrained by a court order from
conversing over the telephone with a child. In that case, however, the
authority to wiretap ought to be pursuant to a court authorization to
determine whether the order not to converse with the minor has been
violated. The conceptual incomprehensibleness of the vicarious con-
sent principle in cases where the parents have joint decisional custody
should be, by itself, enough for courts to reject the vicarious consent
principle, but there are additional problems that also should move
courts in that direction.
ii. The Non-Identity of Interest Problem
Even in a perfect family life, the substituted judgment by a parent
for the decision of a child may not be identical to the best interests of
the child. As Gerald P. Koocher has noted:
The concept of substituted judgment [in which an adult provides a kind of
proxy consent] presumes a great deal. Most notably, it assumes that the per-
son making the decision is willing and able to act in this capacity on the
child's best interests (i.e., without a conflict of interests). Even within the lov-
ing, intact, two-parent family, not all parental decisions regarding children
are without conflicts of interest. Parents often subordinate their needs and
preferences to the best interests of their children (or to what they believe to be
their children's best interests), but this is not always the case. 10 5
David J. Anderman further observed in a 1993 article:
In the majority of parental wiretapping cases reported, however, the family
unit has fallen apart or seems to be deteriorating. Indeed, in only one of the
cases involving parental wiretapping were the parents of the child not di-
vorced or seeking a divorce. The interceptions were not effected for the inter-
105. See Gerald 0. Koocher, Children Under Law: The Paradigm of Consent, in RE-
FORMING THE LAw: IMPACT OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH 3, 14 (Gary B. Mel-
ton ed., 1987) (citations omitted).
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ests of the child, but to give the parent leverage in the settlement of custody
battles. 106
The risk that a parent's substituted judgment will not be in the
best interest of the child is exacerbated in cases where the family is
conflicted by a separation, divorce, or custody fight. In such cases,
there is a greater likelihood of a non-identity of interest between the
parent's choice and the child's best interest. A decision of a parent in
a marital or custodial dispute, to wiretap or bug the conversations of a
child with the other parent, is rife with the risk of non-identity of in-
terest - that the eavesdropping parent is motivated by personal inter-
est or hostile motive against the other parent and not by the best
interests of the child.
Is the increased risk of non-identity of interests in parental elec-
tronic surveillance cases adequately accounted for, or protected
against in courts adoption of the substituted consent doctrine? Given
the limitations of the self-minimization rule of vicarious consent, the
increased risks of non-identity of interests are not adequately ac-
counted for.
iii. Self-Minimization Under the Vicarious Consent
Doctrine
A wiretap on a telephone line records the conversations of all of the
parties that are talking. Even if there is justification for recording
conversations between targeted parties, the pervasive nature of a
wiretap is such that the privacy of parties, for whom there is no justifi-
cation, is invaded. Recording portions of the conversation between
targeted parties may not be justified because they are not relevant to
the legitimate purposes of the eavesdropping. The privacy invasive-
ness of a wiretap led Justice Douglas to describe a wiretap as:
[A] dragnet, sweeping in all conversations within its scope - without regard to
the participants or the nature of the conversations. It intrudes upon the pri-
vacy of those not even suspected of crime and intercepts the most intimate
conversations. 107
Court ordered wiretaps under The Wiretap Act impose an obliga-
tion on the government to minimize the interception of conversations
that are not evidence of criminal conduct.1 0 8 One of the problems with
exceptions to the Wiretap Act in private surveillance cases is the ab-
sence of any court review to determine whether efforts were made to
minimize the overreach of the wiretap or bugging.
106. David J. Anderman, Title III At A Crossroads: The Ordinary Course of Business
in the Home, The Consent of Children, and Parental Wiretapping 141 U. PENN. L.
REV. 2261, 2290 (1993).
107. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 65 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring).
108. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (2000) (setting forth a variety of limitations in the hopes
of minimizing the scope of unnecessary privacy invasions).
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d. The Minimization Problem
The courts that recognize a vicarious consent defense to The Wire-
tap Act in parental eavesdropping cases contemplate self-minimiza-
tion by the parents and/or their lawyer if the lawyer has advised them
of the legality of wiretapping or bugging a child's conversations. The
self-minimization obligation is implicit in the limitation of the vicari-
ous consent authority to eavesdropping where the parent is properly
motivated. Under either the strict or loose sense of proper motivation
that is discussed above, it would not be legal for a parent to wiretap or
bug conversations between their child and a third person if the pur-
pose was simply to gather evidence for prospective or pending custody
or divorce litigation. The proper motive requirement constitutes a
threshold minimization obligation: to demonstrate some reasonable
belief that the surveillance is in the best interest of the child. A par-
ent is not authorized to wiretap or bug conversations to gather evi-
dence that would later justify the surveillance. For the surveillance to
be legal under the vicarious consent doctrine, evidence that would jus-
tify the surveillance must be acquired before the surveillance itself. 109
Whether additional self-minimization requirements are imposed
under the vicarious consent doctrine is not as clear. Are lawyers or
parents required to delete conversations that are clearly not relevant
conversations? One problem is with the use of voice activated record-
ing devices. If such a device is placed on a phone or placed in a bug in
the room, all of the conversations in the room or over the telephone are
recorded. A less inherently pervasive use of technology would be for
the eavesdropping parent to only trigger the recording when he or she
knows the minor is talking to the other parent on the telephone. This
might be unacceptable because it would limit the recording to only
when the parent is at home. One might suggest a minimization re-
quirement analogous to the Wiretap Act that would require the re-
cording parent to delete conversations that are not relevant to the best
interests of the child. The obvious problem with this requirement is
the credibility of the resulting tape in the face that it has been tam-
pered with.
The previous sub-sections have discussed the vicarious consent
principal in two regards: (1) they have provided an interpretation of
the scope and requirements of the rule and (2) offered a critique of the
rule. In view of the problems discussed above, the vicarious consent
principle cannot be supported. The vicarious consent doctrine should
be junked in those jurisdictions that have adopted it and not recog-
nized by other courts in the future.
109. See generally Pollock v. Pollock, 154 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1998) (noting that the
legitimacy of the surveillance hinges on the consenting parent's objective good
faith concern that taping is in the child's best interest).
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F. Silent Video Surveillance
Video surveillance without an accompanying audio component (si-
lent video surveillance) is not a violation of The Wiretap Act of the
ECPA.110 The acquisition of an image is not an interception of a wire
or oral communication because the contents of a conversation are not
acquired. Video surveillance is not the interception of an electronic
communication under The Wiretap Act of the ECPA because there has
been no interception of the image while it is being transmitted. The
audio portion of a videotape is an oral communication and would be
subject to the rules discussed above for interspousal or parental bug-
ging."1 This is also the emerging view in cases arising under state
wiretap statutes. 112
G. The Role of State Law
The question of whether it is legal for a spouse to record the con-
versations of another spouse in the family home under state wiretap
statutes is more complicated. First, the Wiretap and Stored Commu-
nications Acts adopt a floor preemption rule allowing state wiretap
and stored communications acts to provide for greater security for con-
versational privacy and for access to e-mail and voicemail (stored elec-
tronic communications).113 Therefore, state law may be written or
construed to not provide for a marital conflict exception without vio-
lating the Federal Wiretap Act. Second, in civil actions brought for
violations of the state statute the tort interspousal immunity defense
may be available to the wiretapper.
1. Interspousal Exceptions Under State Law
There are only a few state courts that have examined the question
of whether the applicable state wiretap statute contains an exception
for interspousal wiretapping. Most of the courts that have addressed
the question have construed states laws not to contain an interspousal
wiretapping exception.114 It should be noted that state courts within
110. This is the view of all of the federal circuits that have considered the question.
See, e.g., United States v. Falls, 34 F.3d 674, 679-80 (8th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 885-86 (7th Cir. 1984).
111. See supra notes 52-93 and accompanying text.
112. See, e.g., State v. Diaz, 706 A.2d 264, 268 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998); Ricks
v. State, 537 A.2d 612, 616 (Md. 1988); People v. Teicher, 422 N.E.2d 506, 513
(N.Y. 1981).
113. See, for example, State v. Ayres, 383 A.2d 87 (N.H. 1978), where the New Hamp-
shire Supreme Court discussed the stricter consent rule under the state of New
Hampshire's wiretap act, chapter 570-A of the New Hampshire Revised Statutes
Annotated.
114. See generally Stacy L. Mills, Note, He Wouldn't Listen to Me Before, But Now...:
Interspousal Wiretapping and An Analysis of State Wiretapping Statutes, 37
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the two federal circuits that recognize the interspousal wiretapping
exception under federal law are not bound by interpretations of fed-
eral law in interpreting state wiretap acts, even if the state statute
tracks the language of the Wiretap Act. In Ransom v. Ransom,115 the
Supreme Court of Georgia rejected the intercepting spouse's conten-
tion that the state wiretap statute should be construed to recognize an
interspousal wiretap exception as the Fifth Circuit had done in Simp-
son.116 In rejecting this contention, the court relied on the state stat-
ute's purpose to protect every citizen's privacy and on the fact that the
language of the statute did not contain an exception for interspousal
wiretapping.117 New York, like Georgia, does not recognize an inter-
spousal exception under the New York Wiretap Act. 118
2. The State Interspousal Tort Immunity Defense
Interspousal tort immunity could provide a defense to civil suits for
violation of state wiretap acts in cases where the state statute was not
construed to contain an interspousal exception. In such a case, al-
though the state wiretap statute might have been violated, the gen-
eral common law defense of interspousal immunity might be a defense
to a damage action under the statute.
Courts in states that still recognize interspousal tort immunity
have generally not applied the doctrine to actions brought by spouses
for violation of the state wiretap act. In Burgess v. Burgess,119 the
Supreme Court of Florida reversed the lower court and held that the
legislature created an exception to the interspousal tort immunity de-
fense in wiretap cases because the result of the defense, admitting the
tape into evidence, would be contrary to marital harmony, the often
cited purpose of the immunity defense.120 The Delaware Superior
Court came to the same conclusion in interpreting Delaware law in
State v. Jock.12 1
H. Interspousal and Parental Access to E-Mail: Title I of
the ECPA Off the Table
There are only a few appellate court decisions interpreting the le-
gality of interspousal or parental access to e-mail and voicemail. E-
BRANDEIS L.J. 415, 421 (1998) (providing an overarching comparison between
state laws and the federal wiretapping statute).
115. 324 S.E.2d 437 (Ga. 1985).
116. Id. at 438 (disagreeing with the Fifth Circuit's holding in Simpson v. Simpson,
490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1974)).
117. Ransom, 324 S.E.2d at 439.
118. See Pica v. Pica, 417 N.Y.S.2d 528 (1979).
119. 447 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 1984).
120. Id. at 222-23.
121. 404 A.2d 518 (Del. Super. Ct. 1979).
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mail and voicemail cases in other contexts, however, provide a useful
basis for evaluation of domestic conflict cases. Access to e-mail and
voicemail by private parties is primarily regulated under Title II of
the ECPA.122 Title II regulates access to "stored electronic communi-
cations."123 Communications such as e-mail that consist of purely
electronic data are electronic communications. Under the recently en-
acted USA PATRIOT ACT (Patriot Act) amendments to the ECPA,
voicemail is now treated in the same manner as e-mail.' 24
It is well established under federal court precedent that once e-
mail is received and stored in a computer system it is regulated exclu-
sively under the Stored Communications Act. Or to put it another
way, these cases hold that accessing stored e-mail is not an "intercep-
tion" of an electronic communication under the Wiretap Act. The
amendments of the Patriot Act would apply the same rule to
voicemail.
Although the Supreme Court has not decided this question, the de-
cisions of the two federal circuit courts that have considered the issue
indicate that once e-mail is stored, it is exclusively regulated by the
Stored Communications Act.125 In 1994, the Fifth Circuit initially
construed the ECPA to restrict interception under the Wiretap Act to
the contemporary acquisition of the contents of a conversation or com-
munication in Steve Jackson Games v. United States Secret Service. 126
This construction of the Wiretap Act was initially rejected by the
Ninth Circuit in Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines12 7 in 2001. The Konop
court held that e-mail could be intercepted after it was received. 128
Furthermore, the court held that the accessing and downloading of an
e-mail could constitute a violation of both the Wiretap Act and the
Stored Communications Act.129 In a 2002 re-issue of its previous deci-
sion, however, the Ninth Circuit changed its view and concurred with
122. Regulations of government access to e-mail and voicemail, unlike access by a pri-
vate party, may be subject to constitutional restraints under the Fourth Amend-
ment. See, e.g., Leventhal v. Knapek, 266 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v.
Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406 (1996).
123. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (2000).
124. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, H.R. 3162, 107th Cong. § 209
(2001) (enacted) [hereinafter the Patriot Act]. For a general analysis of the impli-
cations of the Patriot Act voicemail amendment to the ECPA, see TURKINGTON &
ALLEN, supra note 6, at 342-45.
125. See Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457 (5th
Cir. 1994); Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 236 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2001), with-
drawn by 262 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2001).
126. 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994).
127. 236 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2001), withdrawn by 262 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2001).
128. Id. at 1046.
129. Id. at 1051.
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the Fifth Circuit's Jackson Games view on the scope of the ECPA's
protection for e-mail.13o
The Fifth and Ninth Circuits' narrow construction of the scope of
protection of e-mail has been severely criticized in commentary and is
by no means a compelling or rational interpretation of the ECPA.
Nevertheless, the absence of a contrary federal circuit court construc-
tion of the federal statute has resulted in the creation of e-mail poli-
cies in the private sector that have relied upon this view of e-mail
protection under federal law. 13 1 In the absence of Supreme Court pre-
cedent, which is unlikely, the current view adopted by the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits, that e-mail that has been received is exclusively sub-
ject to regulation under the Stored Communications Act, is control-
ling. The net effect of this precedent is that spousal access to stored e-
mail is regulated by federal and state stored communications acts.
IV. TITLE II, THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT:
DOWNLOADING E-MAIL FROM COMPUTERS
LOCATED IN THE HOME
In a case where a spouse or parent accesses e-mail from a computer
in the home, the Stored Communications Act may be violated. Section
2701(a) prohibits the intentional accessing and obtaining of e-mail or
voicemail (electronic communications) without authorization while it
is in electronic storage. 13 2
A. Separate E-Mail Accounts and Separate Passwords
Efforts by spouses to segregate e-mail accounts and maintain sepa-
rate private passwords are important in evaluating whether access to
e-mail stored on the hard drive of a family computer is "without au-
thorization" within the meaning of the Stored Communications Act.
Spouses who share access to the hard drive of a mutually used com-
puter located in the homes, but do not share passwords, do not have
authority to access the password protected e-mail files of the other
spouse. Authorized access to the hard drive does not imply authority
to access files that are password protected when the password has
been withheld. By maintaining a separate password, the spouse has
affirmatively intended to exclude the other spouse from the personal
e-mail file. As yet there have been no reported cases under federal or
state stored communications acts, but a Fourth Circuit case on analo-
130. Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002).
131. See TURKINGTON & ALLEN, supra note 6, at 335-39.
132. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2000). Section 2701(a) also prohibits the alteration of e-mail or
voicemail (electronic communications) and acts that prevent authorized access to
e-mail or voicemail. For the e-mail or voicemail to come within § 2701 it must be
in a facility through which an electronic communications service is provided. Id.
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gous facts persuasively rejects the contention of implied authority be-
cause of mutual access to the hard drive of a computer in the home.
In Trulock, III v. Freeh,133 the court held that authority to gener-
ally access the computer hard drive did not include the authority to
access password protected files of a joint computer user. Linda Con-
rad and Notra Trulock jointly used the same computer in an apart-
ment they shared. They protected their personal files with passwords.
Conrad consented to government access to Trulock's protected pass-
word files. In rejecting the government's contention that Trulock
could consent to the Fourth Amendment Search of Conrad's files, the
court concluded:
By using a password, Trulock affirmatively intended to exclude Conrad and
others from his personal files. Moreover, because he concealed his password
from Conrad, it cannot be said that Trulock assumed the risk that Conrad
would permit others to search his files. Thus, Trulock had a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in the password-piotected computer files and Conrad's au-
thority to consent to the search did not extend to them.134
B. The "In Electronic Storage" Requirement of Title II
The requirement that the e-mail or voicemail be in electronic stor-
age may eliminate the Stored Communications Act from applicability
in many domestic conflict cases where the e-mail is in the hard drive
of the computer in the family home. As noted above, only e-mail that
is in "electronic storage" is protected from unauthorized access under
§ 2701 of the Stored Communications Act. Electronic storage is de-
fined in the ECPA as "temporary, immediate storage incidental to the
electronic transmission" or "backup" storage of an electronic communi-
cation.135 In Fraser v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,136 Judge
Brody took judicial notice of the technology of e-mail transmission
that has been invoked favorably by other courts.
Transmission of e-mail from the sender to the recipient through an electronic
communication system ... is indirect. First, an individual authorized to use
the system logs on the system to send a message. After a message is sent, the
system stores the message in temporary or intermediate storage. I will refer
to this storage as "intermediate storage." After a message is sent, the system
also stores a copy of the message in a separate storage for back-up protection,
in the event that the system crashes before transmission is completed. I will
refer to this storage as "back-up protection storage." In the course of trans-
133. 275 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that the password-protected computer files
were accessed by an FBI computer specialist).
134. Id. at 403. Trulock brought a Bivens action against former FBI Director Louis
Freeh and others for violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The Fourth Cir-
cuit held that Freeh enjoyed qualified immunity for the illegal search because the
contours of Fourth Amendment computer consent law had not been established
at the time of the illegal search of Trulock's files. See generally id.
135. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (2000).
136. 135 F. Supp. 2d 623 (E.D Pa. 2001).
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mission from the sender to the recipient, a message passes through both inter-
mediate and backup protection storage.
Transmission is completed when the recipient, logs on to the system and
retrieves the message from intermediate storage. After the message is re-
trieved by the intended recipient, the message is copied to a third type of stor-
age, which I will call "post-transmission storage." A message may remain in
post-transmission storage for several years.
1 3 7
The court in Fraser went on to hold that access to e-mail was not sub-
ject to the Stored Communications Act regulation because "post-trans-
mission storage" is not "in electronic storage."138
C. White v. White 139
The Stored Communications Act prohibits unauthorized access to
an electronic communication (e-mail) while it is in "electronic stor-
age."140 Wiretap statutes in states like New Jersey contain language
that tracks the Federal Stored Communications Act.141 In White v.
White,142 the court evaluated the applicability of state and federal
statutes to interspousal access to e-mail stored on a computer in the
family home. 14 3 The case illustrates issues that face lawyers in such
cases. In White, although separated, the husband and wife lived in
the same house.144 The husband occupied the sunroom of the home
where the family computer, television, and stereo were located. 14 5
The sun room was also the only way to get to the grill on the deck of
the house.146 As a result, all of the members of the family were in and
out of the room.147 After the wife discovered a letter from the hus-
band to his girlfriend, allegedly in plain view, she hired a computer
detective. The detective, at the wife's direction and without using the
husband's password, copied his e-mails that were stored on the hard
drive.148 The court held there was no violation of the New Jersey
137. Id. at 633-34 (citations and footnotes omitted).
138. Id. at 636 (noting the inapplicability of the Stored Communications Act).
139. 781 A.2d 85 (N.J. Super Ct. Ch. Div. 2001).
140. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a)(1)-(2) (2000).
141. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 156A-27(a) (West Supp. 2003).
142. White v. White, 781 A.2d 85 (2001).
143. Id. at 86-87.
144. Id. at 87.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 92.
148. Id. at 87. When installing the America Online (AOL) software, the program auto-
matically created the Personal Filing Cabinet (PFC) on the hard drive of the fam-
ily computer. The PFC automatically saved e-mail but the e-mail was not
automatically password protected and could be accessed by simply opening up the
AOL files on the hard drive. The e-mail could have easily been protected by a
password or by deletion. The husband, however, did not know the e-mail was
saved on the hard drive and took no steps to protect them. Id. at 87-88.
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Wiretap Act for two reasons. 149 First, the e-mail was not in "elec-
tronic storage" when it was accessed. 15 0 Second, access to the e-mail
was not "without authorization" as meant by the Act.151
a. E-Mail Was Not In "Electronic Storage"
In White, the court adopted the accepted technical description of
transmission of e-mail.152 E-mail typically involves three stages of
storage, intermediate, back-up protection storage, and post-transmis-
sion storage.153 Once e-mail has been retrieved by the recipient and
stored, it is in the post-transmission storage stage. 154 Post-transmis-
sion storage was not "electronic storage" within the meaning of the
Wiretap Act.15 5 The Stored Communications Act protected only elec-
tronic communications that are "in the course of transmission or are
backup to that course of transmission." 56 This construction of federal
and state stored communications acts take wiretap statutes off the ta-
ble in cases where spouses access e-mail stored on the hard drive of a
computer in the family home.
b. Unauthorized Use
In White, the court also concluded that access of the e-mail was not
"without authorization" as that concept is meant under the Act. 157
"[Without authorization" was limited to prohibited use of a computer
or unauthorized use of someone's password.158 Because the husband
in White had consented to his wife's access to the computer, her "roam-
ing in and out of different directories on the hard drive" was not "with-
out authorization."'15 9
D. The Interspousal Exception
New Jersey was one of a majority of states that had construed their
state wiretap statute to not contain an exception for interspousal wire-
tapping. The court in White took the same position on the stored elec-
tronic communications portion of the Act.o6 0 Although the court did
not have to discuss the question, it held that the New Jersey Wiretap
149. Id. at 90-91.
150. Id. at 91.
151. Id. at 90-91.
152. Id. at 89.
153. Id. at 89-90.
154. Id. at 90.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 90 (citing Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 135 F. Supp. 2d 623, 637
(E.D. Pa. 2001) (construing the Stored Communications Act)).
157. Id. at 90-91.
158. Id. at 90.
159. Id. at 91.
160. See id.
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Act did not impliedly exempt interspousal accessing of e-mail in the
computer of the home.161
E. The Privacy Intrusion Tort
Most states have recognized a right to privacy tort under state
common law. The seminal call for recognition of privacy rights was
made in a famous article published in the Harvard Law Review in
1890 authored by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis.162 In the
article, the authors focused on tort liability for media publicity of the
private lives of public figures. The current formulation of the common
law of privacy was greatly influenced by an article written by the late
Dean William Prosser in the California Law Review in 1960.163 In
that article, Prosser argued that four torts had emerged from the large
body of common law precedent.16 4 Prosser argued that although the
torts were referred to as involving invasions of privacy, they really
involved different kinds of torts and different invasions.16 5 The four-
part interest analysis and disparate tort theory that Prosser advo-
cated was adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Torts in section
652.166 The Restatement (Second) has been influential and is gener-
ally embraced by courts as an initial premise in analysis of privacy
tort claims. 16 7 The four torts recognized in the Restatement (Second)
are: (1) intrusion upon seclusion; (2) appropriation of name or like-
ness; (3) publicity given to private life; and (4) publicly placing a per-
son in false light.16s Of these, the privacy intrusion tort is the most
relevant to electronic surveillance in domestic disputes. This tort fo-
cuses on invasions of informational or physical privacy through the
acquisition of personal information about a person or through physical
invasions of a person's space or body.
The common law privacy intrusion tort is violated if someone in-
tentionally intrudes upon the private affairs, seclusion, or solitude of
another person by means that would be highly offensive to a person of
ordinary sensibilities. 169 Recently, the Supreme Court of California
161. See id. at 88 (noting the state legislature considered and then rejected inter-
spousal immunity under the New Jersey Wiretap Act).
162. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890)
163. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 (1977).
167. See Jay M. Feinman, Doctrinal Classification and Economic Negligence, 33 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 137, 141 (1996) (noting widespread adoption of the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS).
168. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B-652E (1977).
169. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). Most states have adopted the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS version of the privacy intrusion tort.
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has articulated an important formulation of the intrusion element of
the tort.o7 0 The intrusion element is established if the plaintiff dem-
onstrates that the defendant has "penetrated some zone of physical or
sensory privacy surrounding, or obtained unwanted access to data
about, the plaintiff... if the plaintiff had an objectively reasonable
expectation of seclusion or solitude in the place, conversation or data
source."1 71 Core examples of privacy intrusions provided by the Re-
statement (Second) include: (1) forced entry into a hotel room or home;
(2) looking into someone's bedroom with binoculars; (3) opening pri-
vate personal mail; (4) searching a safe, wallet, or private bank ac-
count; and (5) tapping telephone lines.172
It is well established that an invasion of privacy claim, based on an
intrusion theory, does not require that information or images that are
the object of the intrusion be published or used in any way. The tort is
established by the acquisition of information or the invasion of some-
one's physical space. 17 3 A leading case illustrating this last point is
Hamberger v. Eastman.17 4 The New Hampshire Supreme Court
found a privacy intrusion violation when the defendant surrepti-
tiously placed an audio tape recorder in the plaintiffs' bedroom.17 5
The court found the conduct actionable even though there was no alle-
gation that anyone had listened to the tape:
If the peeping Tom, the big ear and the electronic eavesdropper (whether inge-
nious or ingenuous) have a place in the hierarchy of social values, it ought not
to be at the expense of a married couple minding their own business in the
seclusion of their bedroom who have never asked for or by their conduct de-
served a potential projection of their private conversations and actions to their
landlord or to others. Whether actual or potential such "publicity with respect
to private matters of purely personal concern is an injury to personality. It
impairs the mental peace and comfort of the individual and may produce suf-
fering more acute than that produced by a mere bodily injury."1 7 6
The view that the intrusion itself is a sufficient affront to personal
dignity to be actionable is also reflected in the damage requirement for
privacy intrusion tort actions. Credible evidence of emotional distress
is sufficient in privacy tort actions.177 Expert testimony is not re-
170. See Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998).
171. Id. at 490 (noting the requirements for a cause of action for intrusion).
172. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b (1977).
173. Id.
174. 206 A.2d 239 (N.H. 1964).
175. Id. at 242 (holding defendant liable for privacy intrusion).
176. Id. (quoting III POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 58 (1959)).
177. See Monroe v. Darr, 559 P.2d 322, 327 (Kan. 1977) (noting that scant amount of
evidence of the plaintiffs mental distress was enough to send question to jury);
Trevino v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 582 S.W.2d 582, 584 (Tex. App. 1979) (not-
ing that, because of the nature of the tort at issue, physical damages are unneces-
sary); DAVID. A. ELDER, THE LAW OF PRIVACY, § 2:10, at 57-61 (1991).
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quired for the issue of damages to go to the jury.178 Section 652H of
the Restatement (Second) supports this view:
One who has established a cause of action for invasion of his privacy is enti-
tled to recover damages for
(a) the harm to his interest in privacy resulting from the invasion;
(b) his mental distress proved to have been suffered if it is of a kind that nor-
mally results from such an invasion; and
(c) special damage of which the invasion is a legal cause. 1 7 9
Some defendants have argued that the privacy intrusion tort ought
lo require a showing of extreme or heightened emotional distress anal-
ogous to that required in an intentional infliction of emotional distress
(IIED) case. The best interpretation of the Restatement (Second) and
the above authority is that the privacy intrusion tort does not require
such a showing of extreme or heightened emotional distress and dif-
fers from the IIED in two other important respects.SO First, the IIED
requires a threshold demonstration of conduct by the defendant that
is extreme and outrageous in the sense that the conduct is beyond that
which is tolerated in a civilized society.i81 In a privacy intrusion tort
action, the intrusion must be substantial in the sense that the means
are highly offensive to an ordinary person. The privacy invading con-
duct must violate community standards of decency in an intrusion ac-
tion, but it need not reach the level of social condemnation that is
required for IIED. Second, and most importantly, the quantum of evi-
dence of emotional distress that is required for the case to go to the
jury is much less in an intrusion action. Credible evidence of emo-
tional distress resulting from the intrusion is sufficient for the jury to
consider compensatory damages in an intrusion action. This may be
demonstrated without expert testimony.18 2 The threshold quantum of
evidence in an IIED action is greater and requires demonstration of a
"severe and disabling emotional or mental condition" generally recog-
nized by trained professionals. 183
The interrelationship between the wiretap acts and the common
law privacy intrusion tort in family and custodial dispute electronic
surveillance cases is illustrated by a recent Supreme Court of New
Hampshire case. In Fischer v. Hooper,1 8 4 a divorced husband taped
the conversations of his former wife and daughter without obtaining
178. See Fischer v. Hooper, 732 A.2d 396, 402 (N.H. 1999) (citing Monroe v. Darr, 559
P.2d 322, 327 (Kan. 1977)).
179. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652H (1977).
180. See Miller v. Brooks, 472 S.E.2d 350 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (distinguishing ele-
ments required for cause of action under tort of outrage and privacy intrusion
tort).
181. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965).
182. See Fischer, 732 A.2d at 401 (noting that expert testimony was not required).
183. Waddle v. Sparks, 414 S.E.2d 22, 27 (N.C. 1992) (quoting Johnson v. Ruark Ob-
stetrics & Gynecology Ass'n, 395 S.E.2d 85, 97 (N.C. 1990)).
184. 732 A.2d 396 (N.H. 1999).
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either party's consent.18 5 Upon discovering this, the wife brought a
cause of action under the state wiretap act and for invasion of privacy
under the state common law.' 8 6 The court remanded the case for fur-
ther findings of fact on the state wiretap count, but affirmed the lower
court's decision that the plaintiffs privacy intrusion tort action was
properly submitted to the jury.18 7
In Fischer, the parties had joint custody of their daughter, and a
guardian ad litem and a therapist had been appointed for their daugh-
ter.' 8 8 The husband argued that the wife had no reasonable expectar
tion of privacy of her conversations with her daughter because she
should have expected that the daughter would divulge the content of
their conversations to the therapist. 18 9 Even if this were the case, the
court concluded that the jury might have concluded that the plaintiff
had a reasonable expectation of privacy that her actual voice and
words would not be "captured on tape."'190
Fischer assumes as a basis of its intrusion tort holding that wire-
tap legislation and common law privacy tort claims exist as separate
legal claims even though the misconduct that is the basis of the wire-
tap and privacy intrusion tort actions is the same. In the absence of a
clear intention that the wiretap act was intended to preempt the state
common law, electronic surveillance that constitutes an intrusion
should be actionable even though it might also be a violation of wire-
tap legislation. Given this view that state wiretap and privacy intru-
sion tort claims exist as separate claims, conduct that did not violate
the wiretap act might constitute a violation of the privacy intrusion
tort. This is the view of the Supreme Court of California. 19 1
a. Invasions of Privacy and Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress
As noted above, privacy intrusion and IIED actions do not track
each other. In some marital conflict cases, however, electronic surveil-
lance can be sufficiently outrageous to constitute both torts. A North
Carolina appeals court, in Miller v. Brooks, 19 2 found this to be the
185. Id. at 398.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 398, 402 (noting the holding of the court with respect to privacy and state
wiretap claims).
188. Id. at 398 (noting the status of custody).
189. Id. at 400 (noting the contentions of the defendant regarding plaintiffs alleged
diminished expectation of privacy).
190. Id. at 401 (stating the court's rationale).
191. See Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998) (holding that
recordings of conversations at the scene of an automobile accident did not violate
the California Wiretap Act, but did constitute privacy intrusion tort under state
law).
192. 472 S.E.2d 350 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996).
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case. In Miller, the wife, Annette Miller, hired a private detective to
install a hidden video camera in the bedroom ceiling of the home after
she was separated and agreed not to return to her former marital
home.1 93 She also represented herself as a resident of the home and
intercepted some of her estranged husband's mail.194 Terry Miller,
the husband, sued his estranged wife and the detectives she had hired
for privacy intrusion, IIED, and trespass to real property. 19 5 The trial
court granted summary judgment to the defendants in respect to all of
plaintiffs claims.196 The court of appeals reversed, holding that the
plaintiff had presented evidence that was sufficient to go to a jury on
all claims. 19 7
Defendants contended that the husband had a reduced expectation
of privacy because of his marriage to defendant Annette Miller.19 8 In
rejecting this argument the court noted:
Although a person's reasonable expectation of privacy might, in some cases, be
less for married persons than for single persons, such is not the case here
where the spouses were estranged and living separately. Further, the marital
relationship has no bearing on the acts of [the private detectives]. Plaintiffs
marriage to defendant Miller did nothing to reduce his expectations that his
personal privacy would not be invaded by perfect strangers.1 9 9
The video surveillance, opening of the mail, and trespass into the
plaintiffs property also constituted sufficiently extreme and outra-
geous conduct for the jury to consider emotional distress damages for
IIED.200 The court also ruled that the plaintiff had established suffi-
cient evidence of aggravated conduct for the jury to award punitive
damages for both the privacy intrusion and IIED torts.20 1
b. Privacy Intrusion Tort and Silent Video Surveillance
In cases where federal or state wiretap and stored communications
acts are not violated, the common law privacy intrusion tort may ap-
ply to wiretapping, bugging, silent video surveillance, or electronic
downloading of e-mail that are employed in domestic or custodial con-
flicts. As noted in section F above, silent video surveillance is not reg-
ulated under state and federal wiretap acts. The common law privacy
intrusion tort may apply to silent video surveillance and other forms
of electronic surveillance that are employed in domestic or custodial
conflicts that do not violate federal or state wiretap and stored elec-
193. Id. at 352 (noting the actions of defendants).
194. Id. at 353 (noting the actions of defendant).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 357 (stating the disposition of case).
198. Id. at 354-55 (noting the contention of defendants).
199. Id. at 355.
200. Id. at 356 (noting the sufficiency of evidence for submission to jury).
201. Id. at 357 (reversing summary judgment on the issue of damages).
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tronic communications acts. Nonetheless, as discussed below, while
the intrusion tort would provide a complimentary compensatory dam-
age remedy, the invasion of privacy would not be a basis for excluding
the fruits of the tortuous conduct in divorce or custody proceedings.202
A privacy intrusion tort action might be available in silent video
recordings cases if the video captured images of someone in a private
place where he or she had a reasonable expectation of privacy.20 3 As
illustrated by the court in White v. White,204 the privacy intrusion tort
gives courts flexibility through the "reasonable expectation of privacy"
and "highly offensive means" elements. 2 05 This renders the particular
circumstances of the wiretapping, bugging, or silent video surveillance
critical to the court's analysis. For example, in Alexander v. Path-
finder, Inc. ,206 the court held that the audio taping of conversations
between a mother and staff in a facility for the mentally retarded was
not an intrusion upon the seclusion of the mother because she knew
the conversations were being recorded and did not object. 20 7 Moreo-
ver, in Deteresa v. ABC,208 the surreptitious audio and videotaping by
a television producer of a woman who would not appear on his show
was found not to be a violation of the privacy intrusion tort because
the videotaping occurred in a public place.2 09 The audio taping was
not sufficiently offensive to be actionable because she had spoken to a
person she knew was a reporter.2 1 0 Compare these decisions with the
California Supreme Court's view in Sanders v. ABC.211 In Sanders,
the court held that a telepsychic had a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in conversations with an agent of ABC held in a large room with
rows of cubicles (about 100) in which psychics took their calls.2 12
There is general legal recognition that a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their conversations or conduct at their
202. See infra section III.D.
203. See McCray v. State, 581 A.2d 45, 48 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990) (holding that
government video taping was not a search because a person walking on a public
sidewalk or street has no reasonable expectation of privacy in activities in public
view).
204. 781 A.2d 85 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2001).
205. See generally id. (holding that a wife's intrusion into her husband's e-mail that
was stored on the hard drive of the family computer was not "highly offensive"
given that the husband had no "reasonable expectation of privacy" in the area).
206. 189 F.3d 735 (8th Cir. 1999).
207. See id. at 742-43 (noting fact that mother did not object to recording by institu-
tion's employees).
208. 121 F.3d 460 (9th Cir. 1997).
209. Id. at 466 (refusing to sustain cause of action where plaintiff was videotaped in
public view).
210. Id. (noting that the plaintiff knew the person was a reporter).
211. 978 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999).
212. Id. at 923
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home. 2 13 Surreptitious wiretapping, bugging, or video surveillance in
a person's home clearly constitutes an intentional intrusion into the
subject's seclusion or private affairs. Courts early on recognized sur-
reptitious audio taping by a landlord in a tenant's bedroom as an inva-
sion of privacy.214 Moreover, the Restatement (Second) considers
surreptitious video and audio surveillance to be a paradigm of intru-
sion into seclusion and private affairs. 2 15
Surreptitious wiretapping, bugging, and videotaping in domestic
and custodial conflicts have generally been found to be actionable in-
trusions. Courts that have considered wiretap act construction have
not been inclined to recognize a marital conflict or vicarious consent
defense in privacy intrusion tort actions. The notion of vicarious con-
sent is irrelevant in a privacy intrusion tort action. Consent is a de-
fense to the tort action, but it is the consent of the party whose privacy
in invaded that is relevant. Even if the custodial parent could consent
for the child, there could be no vicarious consent to the invasion of
privacy of the non-custodial parent or other third parties. There, con-
sent would be governed by general tort principles of actual, express, or
implied consent. 2 16
For example, in Fischer, the New Hampshire Supreme Court found
that a custodial parent's taping of telephone conversations between
his daughter and former wife to have constituted an intrusion. 2 17 Al-
though the court had appointed a therapist for the daughter, the court
found that the mother retained a reasonable expectation that the con-
versation would not be electronically recorded because the mother
should have expected that the daughter would discuss her conversa-
tions with the therapist.2 18 The court treated consent to be governed
by general tort principles. 2 19 Similarly, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals found that the placement of a hidden video camera in the
213. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967).
214. See Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239 (N.H. 1964).
215. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b (1977).
216. See Dieteman v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding no express or
implied consent for surreptitious photography and audio taping of office visit
when Dieteman invited reporter claiming to be patient into office in Dieteman's
home); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 (1977).
217. Fischer v. Hooper, 732 A.2d 396, 398-401 (N.H. 1999).
218. Id.
219. See id. at 405. The court held that the trial court had properly instructed the jury
that whether the mother had impliedly consented to the surveillance, depended
upon whether her conduct in fact constituted implied consent and that the trial
court did not error in failing to include the term "acquiescence" in the instruc-
tions to the jury on consent. Id.
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home and bedroom of an estranged husband by his wife was a highly
offensive intrusion into his private affairs and seclusion.22o
c. Interspousal Access to E-Mail and the Privacy Intrusion Tort
Employees seeking damages for violation of the privacy intrusion
tort against employers who accessed their e-mail have generally been
unsuccessful. Courts have used the alternative grounds that the em-
ployee has no reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail stored in a
business computer network and that employer access is not an offen-
sive means within the privacy intrusion tort. This has been the hold-
ing even if the employer published policy was that e-mail
communications are confidential and not monitored. A leading and
controversial case is Smyth v. Pillsbury Co.2 2 1 There, a federal dis-
trict court held Smyth had no reasonable expectation of privacy in e-
mail communications to a supervisor over an e-mail system that was
"apparently utilized by the entire company."222 The court also found
accessing the particular communications was not a "highly offensive
invasion of privacy."223 A Texas court of appeals court took a similar
view in McClaren v. Microsoft Corp.2 24 A superior court in Massachu-
setts, however, has taken a different view and would recognize a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in employee e-mail. 2 25
The validity of decisions that fail to recognize that employees have
reasonable expectations of privacy in privacy intrusion tort actions
brought against employers for access to employee e-mail in company
e-mail systems is beyond the scope of this Article. It is clear, however,
that these cases do not control the question of whether spousal access
to e-mail stored in a computer in the family or marital home is a viola-
tion of the privacy intrusion tort. As proprietors of company e-mail
systems, employers have authority to access employee e-mail under
the Stored Communications Act. 2 26 Even employees have reasonable
220. See Miller v. Brooks, 472 S.E.2d 350, 354 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996). The defendant
wife's conduct also included opening the husband's mail. Id. The case, however
seems to hold that the video surveillance by itself was sufficient to constitute a
privacy intrusion cause of action.
221. 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
222. Id. at 101 (holding Smyth did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy).
223. Id. (holding that access to Smyth's e-mails was not "highly offensive").
224. No. 05-97-00824-CV, 1999 WL 339015, at *4-*5 (Tex. App. May 28, 1999) (not
designated for publication) (holding that access to an employee e-mail by another
employee was not highly offensive and the employee did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy).
225. See Restuccia v. Burk Tech., Inc., No. CA 952125, 1996 WL 1329386, at *3 (Mass.
Super. Aug. 13, 1996).
226. Section 2701(c) of the Stored Communications Act provides that it is not unlawful
to access stored electronic communications if access is authorized "by the person
or entity providing a wire or electronic communications service." 18 U.S.C.
§ 2701(c)(1) (2000).
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expectations of privacy in e-mail stored outside of company e-mail sys-
tems. In a leading case, United States v. Maxwell,22 7 the court held
that a United States Air Force Colonel had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in e-mail messages stored in his internet service provider's
central computer under a contractual privacy policy not to disclose the
e-mail to anyone other than an authorized user or pursuant to a court
order.228
The reasonableness of privacy expectations in e-mail stored in com-
puters in the home will depend upon whether the spouse has con-
sented or authorized access to the e-mail by the other spouse. If
separate e-mail accounts and separate passwords are maintained by
spouses who jointly share a computer with joint access to the main
drive, each spouse would have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
their separate e-mail accounts. As observed by the Trulock court in
the discussion above,2 29 a spouse's affirmative act of maintaining a
separate e-mail account and password demonstrates an intention to
exclude others, including the other spouse, from the personal e-mail
files. By this act, the spouse has a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the password-protected files.230
White v. White,231 discussed above, illustrates the importance of
password-protected e-mail files in privacy intrusion tort actions. The
court in White rejected Mr. White's claim that accessing stored e-mail
by Mrs. White constituted a violation of the privacy intrusion tort. As
correctly observed by the court, the plaintiff must have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the area or information that is accessed and
the means of access must be highly offensive for a tortious invasion of
privacy to occur.23 2 Both spouses and their children had authority to
access the hard drive of the computer which was located in the sun
room of the home. Under the e-mail service agreement with America
Online (AOL), and unknown to Mr. White, he was saving e-mail he
sent and received on the hard drive of the computer. Because he did
not know he was doing this, he did not delete or protect the e-mail
with a password. In light of the authority given to both spouses to
access the hard drive, Mr. White had no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in e-mail on the hard drive of the computer. The court analogized
the computer to an office file cabinet in a room both spouses had com-
227. 45 M.J. 406 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
228. Id. at 417-19 (holding that the Colonel had an expectation of privacy). The e-mail
in question was generated by computer hardware, software, and accessories that
were purchased and maintained by Maxwell. Use of the computer and services
by Maxwell was not in connection with his official Air Force duties. Id. at 411.
229. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
230. See Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 403 (4th Cir. 2001); see also supra text accom-
panying notes 125-130.
231. 781 A-2d 85 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2001); see also supra subsection HI.1.3.
232. Id. at 91-92.
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plete access to.233 The privacy intrusion tort becomes important in
spousal access to e-mail cases because, as discussed in the section
above, several courts have construed the Stored Communications Act
as not applying to e-mail stored in computers in the home.234 As
noted in the section below, however, violations of the privacy intrusion
tort will provide a damage remedy for the spouse whose privacy is in-
vaded, but the tort violation is not an independent basis for excluding
the illegally acquired e-mail from divorce or custody proceedings. 235
V. EXCLUSION OF FRUITS OF ILLEGAL SURVEILLANCE
A. The Fault Requirement for Violation of the ECPA
Criminal responsibility, damage remedies, and the exclusionary
rule are only triggered if there is a willful or intentional violation of
the ECPA. Section 2511 of the 1968 Wiretap Act limited criminal
sanctions to "willful" violations of the statute.23 6 Although initially
there was no reference to "willful" in § 2520, the damage section of the
statute, courts generally required a finding that the defendant had
acted willfully for damages to be recoverable. 23 7 "Willful," within the
meaning of § 2511 or § 2520, was interpreted the way it is generally
constructed in federal criminal statutes and was not limited to a
knowing violation of the statute; "willful" has the broader meaning of
"reckless disregard of a known legal duty."238 As elaborated by a lead-
ing case:
The word [willful] often denotes an act which is intentional or knowing or
voluntary, as distinguished from accidental. But when used in a criminal
statute it generally means an act done with a bad purpose; without justifiable
excuse; stubbornly, obstinately, perversely. The word is also employed to
characterize a thing done without ground for believing it is lawful, or conduct
marked by careless disregard whether or not one has the right so to act. 2 3 9
Thus, accidental or negligent violations of the statute will not sat-
isfy the fault requirement in § 2511 and § 2520 of the ECPA. It is
enough, however, that the interception was done "without justifiable
excuse[,] stubbornly, obstinately, perversely", or "without ground for
233. Id. at 92. The analogy was based upon a New Jersey case where the husband
unsuccessfully tried to suppress love letters that had been discovered by the wife
in file cabinets she had full access to. See DelPresto v. DelPresto, 235 A.2d 240,
245-46 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967).
234. See discussion supra Part 11.1.2. of White and other courts not viewing e-mail
stored in computers in the home or workplace as " in electronic storage" under
state and federal Stored Communications Acts.
235. See infra notes 271-75 and accompanying text.
236. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (2000).
237. See Citron v. Citron, 722 F.2d 14, 16 (2d Cir. 1983); Kratz v. Kratz, 477 F. Supp.
463, 467 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
238. Citron, 722 F.2d at 16.
239. United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394-95 (1933) (citations omitted).
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believing it was lawful", or with "careless disregard whether or not
one [had] the right ... to act."2 40
In many cases, "willfully" may be treated as a factual question for
the jury. Illustrative of this point is the court's decision in Citron v.
Citron.241 In Citron, Fiona Citron taped conversations between her
husband and their adopted children, Steven and Alisande.242 She
continued to tape the conversations after consulting her attorney.2 43
After discovering that some of his conversations with the children had
been recorded, Casper, Steven, and Alisande brought a damage action
under § 2520 of the Federal Wiretap Act. 2 44 The Second Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the complaint after the jury in a
special verdict found that Fiona had not acted intentionally or reck-
lessly in taping the conversations. 245
Citron also reflects the general view taken by courts that § 2511,
the "willfulness" standard in the criminal law provision, has the same
meanings as in § 2520, the damage section.246 The damage provision
of the Wiretap Act provides that a "good faith reliance on... a legisla-
tive authorization . . . or a statutory authorization" constitutes a de-
fense.2 47 This section tracks the general notion of "willfulness"
required for negligence, but is generally regarded as specifically ad-
dressing "good faith" on the part of law enforcement officials or their
assistants. 248 State courts have construed "willfully" under state
wiretap acts similarly. 249 Although there is ambiguity in the fault re-
quirement because recklessness is sufficient, it is clear that a jury de-
termination that the defendant acted with a good faith belief that her
conduct was lawful is sufficient to satisfy the recklessness
requirement.2 50
The ECPA substituted "intentional" for "willfully" in § 2511 and
added "intentional" to portions of § 2520.251 Courts generally do not
240. Citron, 722 F.2d at 16 (quoting Murdock, 290 U.S. at 394-95); see also Kratz, 477
F. Supp. at 478-79; Heggy v. Heggy, 944 F.2d 1537, 1542 (10th Cir. 1991).
241. 722 F.2d 14 (1983).
242. Id. at 15.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 17.
246. Id. at 16.
247. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(d)(1) (2000).
248. See Citron v. Citron, 722 F.2d 14, 16 (2d Cir. 1983)
249. See Fischer v. Hooper, 732 A.2d 396, 400 (N.H. 1999).
250. See id.
251. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, §§ 101(f),
103, 100 Stat. 1853, 1854 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, 2520
(2000)).
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consider this change to alter the pre-ECPA view that recklessness, as
explained above, satisfies the fault requirement. 25 2
B. The Federal Wiretap's Strict Exclusionary Rule
The Wiretap Act has a strict exclusionary rule.253 Section 2515
excludes any part of the contents of an illegally intercepted communi-
cation from being admitted into any legal proceedings before state or
federal legislatures, courts, or administrative agencies. 254 Evidence is
only excluded under the Wiretap Act if it is the fruit of activities that
constitute a violation of the Wiretap Act. Therefore, the fruits of elec-
tronic surveillance would be admissible in a state court divorce or cus-
tody proceeding if surveillance was exempt from the Wiretap Act
because of the spousal marital conflict exception. 25 5 This would also
be the case if the electronic surveillance was exempt because the par-
ent had authority to vicariously consent for the child whose conversa-
tions were recorded. 256 Evidence procured from an interception that
was not willful or intentional could also be admitted in state court
proceedings as those interceptions are not illegal under the Wiretap
Act.2 57
The exclusionary force of the Wiretap Act violations in state di-
vorce or custody proceedings has been acknowledged by state
courts.258 In In re Marriage of Lopp,259 the Supreme Court of Indiana
held that it was not reversible error for a trial judge to hear wiretaps
procured in violation of The Wiretap Act where the wiretap victim
claimed that the wiretaps were used by her spouse to blackmail her
into signing a provisional custody order.2 60 The court decided that
even if § 2515 generally required exclusion of wiretaps introduced to
establish the merits of the controversy, the exclusionary rule was not
applicable to conversations introduced to challenge the credibility of
witnesses or to conversations that were pertinent to allegations of tes-
252. See Heggy v. Heggy, 944 F.2d 1537 (10th Cir. 1991); Citron v. Citron, 722 F.2d 14
(2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 973 (1984); Kratz v. Kratz, 477 F. Supp. 463
E.D. Pa. 1979).
253. See 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (2000).
254. Id.
255. As noted earlier the Fifth Circuit and Second Circuit have recognized a limited
marital conflict exception. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text
256. See supra subsection II.E.2.
257. See supra section III.A.
258. See Markham v. Markham, 265 So. 2d 59, 60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972), af/d, 272
So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1973); Rickenbaker v. Rickenbaker, 222 S.E.2d 463, 465 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1976), modified, 226 S.E.2d 347 (N.C. 1976).
259. 378 N.E.2d 414 (Ind. 1978).
260. See id. at 422 (noting that the circumstances rendered the court's review of tapes
obtained not reversible error).
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timony defrauding the court.26 1 To apply the exclusionary rule of §
2515 to such cases would violate the Due Process Clause and consti-
tute an unconstitutional impairment of essential functions of state
judges and state sovereignty.26 2
Lopp does not represent an important exception to the Wiretap
Act's exclusionary rule. The state sovereignty case relied upon in
Lopp was National League of Cities v. Usery.2 63 National League of
Cities held that Federal Commerce Clause legislation imposing a min-
imum wage requirement on local government entities violated state
sovereignty.2 64 The minimum wage holding of National League of Cit-
ies was overruled in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Au-
thority.26 5 Nevertheless, in two cases subsequent to Garcia, the
Supreme Court has found federal legislation enacted under the Com-
merce Clause to violate state sovereignty. 266 These cases, however,
did not involve state activity closely akin to that in Lopp. Instead, the
cases involved federal legislation that required states to legislate26 7
and imposed an obligation on state and local law enforcement officers
to do background checks and perform other tasks that were connected
to the purchase of handguns.26 s In Testa v. Katt,2 69 a case more
closely related to the state activity in Lopp, the Court held that federal
legislation requiring state courts to enforce federally created causes of
action does not violate state sovereignty. Therefore, because Lopp is
inconsistent with Testa, Lopp should not be followed.
C. No Exclusionary Rule Under Title II
As noted earlier, there is no exclusionary rule explicitly in the
Stored Communications Act. There is no basis for implying an exclu-
sionary rule because § 2708 specifically states that the remedies
under the Stored Communications Act are limited to those that are
enumerated. 2 70 As a consequence, even if access to e-mail or
voicemail violates the Stored Communications Act, the e-mail or
261. Id. (noting that it would be illogical to apply the exclusionary rule under certain
circumstances).
262. See id. at 423 (noting potential issues of federalism).
263. See id. (citing Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)).
264. See Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851-52 (1976) (striking down
mandatory minimum wage for state employees), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
265. 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985).
266. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 932-33 (1997); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
267. New York, 504 U.S. at 188.
268. Printz, 521 U.S. at 932-33.
269. 330 U.S. 386, 393 (1947)
270. See 18 U.S.C. § 2708 (2000).
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voicemail would be admissible in divorce or custody proceedings in
state court.
D. Exclusion of Evidence for Privacy Intrusion Tort
Invasions
The absence of an exclusionary rule under the Stored Communica-
tions Act means evidence from the fruits of invasions of privacy
through illegal access to e-mail and voicemail is admissible in divorce
and custody proceedings under the Federal Stored Communications
Act. As suggested above, conduct that violates the Stored Communi-
cations Act also may constitute an invasion of privacy under common
law tort. To determine admissibility, however, it must first be deter-
mined whether the common law of torts provides an independent ba-
sis for excluding evidence. As a general matter there is no common
law exclusionary rule. The fact that evidence is acquired in the com-
mission of a tort is not by itself a sufficient reason for excluding the
evidence if it is relevant or material in a subsequent civil or criminal
court proceeding. In cases where the government violates constitu-
tional provisions such as the Fourth Amendment, a rule excluding in-
troduction of the fruits of the illegal search has been adopted by the
Court as a deterrent to police and on the basis that the government as
guardian of our rights should not benefit from acting illegally.271 In
some instances, such as the Wiretap Act, the legislature has adopted
an exclusionary rule to enforce standards in statutes. These exclu-
sionary rules express the idea that privacy, over the integrity of fact
finding and the justice dispensing function of courts, should be given
priority when enforcing the prohibited statutory conduct. In the case
of constitutional or legislative exclusionary rules, exclusion of evi-
dence is designed as a means for enforcing the constitutional or legis-
lative standards and policies that are in place.
Remedies that are built into the remedies that are part of our long-
standing common law tort traditions are viewed by courts as sufficient
to further tort policies of compensating tort victims and deterring of
tortious conduct. Compensatory tort damages include money for phys-
ical and emotional pain and suffering as well as out of pocket economic
loss. Deterrence is promoted indirectly by granting compensatory
damages awards through insurance rates. 2 72 Direct deterrence is pro-
moted through punitive damage awards. 27 3 Given this, it is not sur-
prising that there is little or no authority to exclude relevant and
material evidence in custody or divorce proceedings on the basis that
271. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.1 (3d ed. 2000).
272. For a general discussion of the role of compensatory and punitive damages and
insurance with regard to deterrence in tort law, see GEORGE C. CHRISTIE ET AL.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAw OF TORTS 735 (3d ed. 1997).
273. See id. at 792.
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the evidence is the fruit of conduct that constitutes a common law tort
violation. There may be cases where a court might exclude evidence
in a civil proceeding on the basis of improper conduct of parties or
lawyers in those proceedings. In Shoney's v. Lewis, Inc.,274 for exam-
ple, the Kentucky Supreme Court excluded the introduction of evi-
dence that was procured by one of the lawyers before the court in
violation of a code of professional conduct rule.275 In that case, how-
ever, the court was exercising its authority to sanction conduct that
was unethical by a lawyer who is an officer of the court system.
VI. MINIMIZATION OF PRIVACY INVASIONS BY PROTECTIVE
ORDERS IN DISCOVERY
As suggested in Parts III and IV of this article, the Wiretap Act
and the Stored Communications Act have been construed to allow for
the electronic surveillance of communications or conversations with-
out a filtering mechanism that would minimize invasions of privacy of
innocent persons; those persons communicating or conversing about
matters unrelated to the legitimate justification for the electronic sur-
veillance. The absence of a filtering mechanism for minimization is a
serious problem because significant invasions of privacy occur and are
sanctioned by law even though there is no justification for the privacy
invasions. The minimization problems arises in two related situa-
tions: (1) where the ECPA allows for the electronic surveillance of con-
versations or the unauthorized access to digital communications of
innocent persons and (2) where the content of the conversation or com-
munication may be admitted in a judicial proceeding because of the
absence of an exclusionary rule.
This section will examine the extent to which privacy protection in
discovery rules and under state and federal constitutions may be uti-
lized to function as de facto exclusionary rules that minimize the in-
troduction of innocent person's conversations or communications into
records of judicial proceedings. Preventing the introduction of inno-
cent personal conversations or communications into court records is
important for privacy protection because judicial records are probably
the most public records in our legal system.
The ECPA does not provide for exclusion of an innocent person's
conversations or communications in two instances. There is no exclu-
sion under The Wiretap Act in cases where courts recognize an excep-
tion to unauthorized interceptions of conversations in marital conflicts
or for parents intercepting the conversations of their minor children.
Although The Wiretap Act has a strong exclusionary rule it does not
274. 875 S.W.2d 514 (Ky. 1994).
275. The attorney violated a rule prohibiting ex parte communication between a law-
yer and a party represented by another lawyer. See id. at 516.
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apply because there has been no violation of the Wiretap Act. Perhaps
more importantly there is no exclusion under the Stored Communica-
tions Act in any case where e-mail or voicemail is accessed even if' the
access violates the Stored Communications Act. Nevertheless, privacy
rights recognized in discovery rules and federal and state constitu-
tions provide rules for preventing innocent persons' communications
or conversations from introduction into judicial proceedings.
A. Constitutionally Based Privacy Rights
There are two traditions of privacy rights under the United States
Constitution 276 and the constitutions of several states. Decisional pri-
vacy rights protect independence of decisions for matters such as abor-
tion. Informational privacy rights recognize a right of persons to
decide whether the government shall have access to highly personal or
intimate information about them. Informational privacy rights are
protected under unreasonable search and seizure provisions in the
federal and state constitutions. These rights are also protected under
the due process clauses of state and federal constitutions. 277 Com-
pelled disclosure of highly personal or intimate information in the dis-
covery process triggers these rights. These privacy rights compel
courts to balance privacy interests with the need to know.2 78 In di-
vorce and custody cases, where there are requests for disclosure of in-
tercepted conversations or stored e-mail and voicemail in the
discovery process, this constitutionally based informational privacy
right may be utilized to preclude innocent conversations or communi-
cations from access in discovery.
State and federal discovery rules also provide for privacy rights
that would restrict discovery of innocent conversations or communica-
tions in divorce and custody cases. Under Rule 26(c) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure courts are authorized to limit discovery and
provide protective orders, when data sought would cause unreasona-
ble "annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue burden."2 79
State discovery rules generally track Rule 26(c). 280 While the lan-
gnage in Rule 26(c) and analogous state rules do not specifically men-
tion privacy, it is clear that serious invasions of privacy are
276. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
277. For a general discussion of constitutionally based privacy right theory and bal-
ancing of interest test, see Richard C. Turkington, Legacy of the Warren and
Brandeis Article: The Emerging Unencumbered Constitutional Right to Informa-
tional Privacy, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 479, 487-509 (1990) and Seth F. Kreimer,
Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and Disclo-
sure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 136-47 (1991).
278. See Kreimer, supra note 277, at 146-47; Turkington, supra note 277, at 508-09.
279. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
280. See Rasmussen v. S. Fla. Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 535 (Fla. 1987); Sten-
ger v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Ctr., 609 A.2d. 796, 799 n.6 (Pa. 1992).
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included.281 The availability of a protective order under discovery
rules to protect privacy is determined by balancing privacy interests
with the need to know, very much like the balancing test under the
constitutional right to privacy discussed above. 2 82
VII. CONCLUSION
Use of electronic technology to capture conversations or images
and to access e-mail or voicemail is not uncommon in marriage and
custody disputes between married persons and parents. Surreptitious
use of this technology invades the privacy of the non-consenting party.
Assessing the legality of these activities is complicated, because a vari-
ety of legal institutions are implicated. This article has primarily ex-
amined whether electronic surveillance in domestic disputes violates
federal and state stored communications and wiretap acts and the
common law privacy intrusion tort. Wiretap acts generally restrict
surreptitious recording of conversations with two limited exceptions.
A minority of courts allow spouses to record conversations of other
spouses on the extension phone in the marital home. There is greater
authority to record conversations of a minor child on the extension
phone in the home. Recently, a potentially more expansive third ex-
ception has been adopted by almost all of the courts that have consid-
ered it. This exception would authorize parents to vicariously consent
to a wiretap on behalf of their minor child if the parent believes it is in
the child's best interest. If the vicarious consent rule is adopted, state
and federal wiretap acts that provide a one party consent defense are
not violated.
The vicarious consent doctrine should be rejected primarily for two
reasons: (1) the intercepting spouse is not sufficiently accountable for
invasions of privacy to a non-consenting third party who is conversing
with the child and (2) the vicarious consent doctrine is incomprehensi-
ble in view of state joint custody laws.
Access to e-mail and voicemail is primarily regulated by state and
federal stored communications acts. This is a developing area of law
and there are few appellate court decisions that construe the stored
communications acts in domestic conflict cases. The clear trend is to
find these statutes not applicable because e-mail stored in the home is
not "in electronic storage." Beyond that, even if stored communica-
tions acts are violated, the fruits of such illegality may still be admit-
ted in civil court proceedings because, unlike wiretap acts, stored
communications acts do not contain an exclusionary rule.
281. See Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d at 535; Stenger, 609 A.2d at 803.
282. Some courts view the constitutionally based privacy right to be incorporated into
the limitations on privacy contained in Rule 26(c) and analogous state discovery
rules. See Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1547 (11th Cir.
1985); Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d at 535; Stenger, 609 A.2d at 803.
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Electronic surveillance in domestic conflicts may be tortious under
the common law privacy intrusion tort. This tort fills a void because it
would reach silent video surveillance, an activity that is not regulated
under wiretap and stored communications acts. In the examination of
privacy intrusion tort cases, it is clear that surreptitious audio and
video surveillance in domestic conflict cases may constitute tortious
conduct even if the conduct does not violate wiretap and stored elec-
tronic communications acts. When analyzing such cases, one should
examine the extent to which parties may have reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy in conversations and communications within the
meaning of the privacy intrusion tort. In addition, it would be tortious
for a spouse to access e-mail stored in a home computer if the e-mail is
stored in a segregated e-mail account and the parties have maintained
separate private passwords.
Much of the evidence that is obtained by illegal electronic surveil-
lance may be admissible in marriage and custody proceedings because
violations of stored electronic communications acts and the privacy in-
trusion tort do not provide a basis for excluding evidence in civil court
proceedings. Protective orders based upon discovery rules and consti-
tutional privacy rights may provide a way to protect privacy by exclud-
ing some communications or images from admissibility in judicial
records.
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